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I. INTRODUCTION
The history of humankind is for the most part the story of a struggle
to survive. For the overwhelming majority of people, life has largely
consisted of the pursuit of food and shelter and the avoidance of calam-
ity. The last 500 years or so, however, have seen unprecedented
economic growth. About a quarter of the world's population now enjoy a
material standard of living which, judged against the backdrop of his-
tory, is extraordinarily high. Billions more are at least relatively secure in
the satisfaction of what are nowadays seen as their basic needs-not just
food and shelter, but at least a rudimentary level of education, medical
care, and so on. And yet the number of people living in desperate pov-
erty is still enormous and possibly greater than ever before.
One method of alleviating poverty might be to redistribute the
wealth which already exists in the world. There is, it seems, enough.
This logically-possible solution suffers from a number of problems,
however, not the least of which is that it seems most unlikely to happen.
The only alternative solution to the problem of poverty seems to be eco-
nomic growth. If the economic successes of the richer countries could
somehow be emulated by the poorer ones, perhaps the problem could be
solved. Growth will not necessarily end poverty because the fruits of it
might go to some only and not to all (as has happened, taking the world
as a whole, to date). For practical purposes, however, growth seems to be
a prerequisite to the alleviation of poverty.
How best to promote economic growth in less-developed countries is
perhaps, therefore, the most important political question facing the world
today. One way in which many of these countries have sought to do it is
by attracting foreign investment, and one way in which they have sought,
in turn, to do that is by offering tax incentives to foreign investors. The
basic idea is that growth requires capital and technology; that the less
developed countries have insufficient capital and insufficient technology;
[Vol. 26:411
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that if a foreign firm invests in a country (by, to take the prototypical
case, building a factory), it supplies both capital and technology; and that
foreign firms are more likely to do this if they are taxed lightly or not at
all.
One problem with this strategy is that it might lead to a "race to the
bottom." If one country seeks to attract foreign investment by offering
preferential tax treatment (that is, by taxing foreign investors less heavily
than it taxes resident investors), other countries might be more generous
still. The ultimate consequence might be that countries go on cutting the
taxes they impose on foreign investors until the benefit they derive is
reduced to zero. Thus, tax competition, rather than facilitating growth in
poor countries, might merely enable firms from rich countries to go on
exploiting the resources of poor ones (land, labor, minerals, and so on).
Indeed, perhaps the principal effect of such incentives is to make such
exploitation more profitable than before. In other words, tax incentives
targeted at foreign investors, far from alleviating poverty, might perpetu-
ate and even exacerbate it.'
If developing countries succeed in attracting foreign investment, this
could entail negative consequences for the country of residence of the
foreign investor. For example, a firm might close down a factory in a
high-tax rich country and establish a new one in a low-tax poor country.
From the rich country's point of view, the consequences might include
both (a) a decrease in economic activity generally (manifesting itself in
job losses, in particular) and (b) a fall in government revenue. It is not
surprising, then, that the rich countries have watched with some discom-
fort the efforts of the developing countries to attract foreign investment
by means of tax incentives.
In recent years, the discomfort has led to action. Most notably, the
Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD or
Organization) (apparently prompted by the G7 countries-the United
States, Japan, Germany, the UK, France, Italy, and Canada) has em-
barked on a "project" to eradicate two forms of "harmful tax
competition," namely (1) tax havens and (2) harmful preferential tax re-
gimes.2
1. See Reuven Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the
Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1639-48 (2000).
2. OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION: AN EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE (1998), at
http://www.oecd.org/ dataoecd/33/0/1904176.pdf [hereinafter OECD, 1998]; OECD, To-
WARDS GLOBAL TAX CO-OPERATION: REPORT TO THE 2000 MINISTERIAL COUNCIL MEETING
AND RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS: PROGRESS IN IDENTIFYING
AND ELIMINATING HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES (2000), at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/61/
2090192.pdf [hereinafter OECD, 2000]; OECD, THE OECD's PROJECT ON HARMFUL TAX
PRACTICES: THE 2001 PROGRESS REPORT (2001), at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/60/
28/2664438.pdf [hereinafter OECD, 2001]; and OECD, THE OECD's PROJECT ON HARMFUL
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A tax haven is essentially a jurisdiction which serves as a means by
which firms and individuals resident in other jurisdictions can escape the
taxes that they would otherwise be obliged to pay there. There are at
least several dozen tax havens in the world. The OECD's objective is to
eliminate them. That is, its objective is to persuade these jurisdictions to
remodel their tax systems so that they can no longer be used to avoid
other jurisdictions' taxes. Jurisdictions functioning as tax havens pre-
sumably benefit from doing so (or, at least, perceive themselves as
benefiting).' Therefore, persuading them to desist will presumably re-
quire carrots or sticks or both. But defining "tax haven" is more difficult
than it might appear.
A preferential tax regime is essentially a targeted tax incentive. That
is, a country might operate a "normal" tax system, but exempt specified
classes of income from tax (or subject them to tax at lower rates than
apply to other forms of income).4 The tax incentives with which develop-
ing countries seek to attract foreign investment are, thus, preferential
regimes. Currently there exist in the world hundreds of such regimes.
Again, the OECD's objective is to eliminate them--or, at least, to elimi-
nate such of them as may be "harmful." As with the Organization's
campaign to eradicate havens, it seems inevitable that this will require
sanctions or enticements or both. But defining "preferential tax regime"
is no easier than defining "tax haven," and the distinction drawn by the
OECD between those preferential regimes that are "harmful" and those
that are not is likewise problematic.
TAX PRACTICES: THE 2004 PROGRESS REPORT (2004), at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/
60/33/30901115.pdf [hereinafter OECD, 2004].
3. In order to function satisfactorily as a tax haven, a jurisdiction must generally pro-
vide legal, accounting, banking and related services of a standard acceptable to clients (that is,
those wishing to avoid taxes) in developed countries. Tax avoidance is indeed a very substan-
tial industry. The revenues generated by the provision of such services may account for a
substantial part of the haven's economy. In some cases, depending on the tax structure of the
haven in question, taxes paid by those providing the services likewise account for a substantial
part of the haven's public revenues. The extent to which the tax avoidance industry benefits
the residents of havens generally (as distinct from merely benefiting those who work in that
industry) is debatable, but it seems reasonable to assume that there is generally some benefit.
4. OECD, 1998, supra note 2, at para. 35. Given the very great diversity of tax sys-
tems which exist in the world, and the even greater diversity of theories as to how, if at all,
income ought to be taxed, it seems clear that the assumption that there is such a thing as a
"normal" income tax is problematic. That the OECD proceeded on this basis is, however,
indicative of a tendency to assume that its Member States' ways of going about things are
normal and that those of the rest of the world are not.
5. Some countries offer no tax incentives, but others (including, as will be seen, some
of the OECD's own members) offer several. To cite only one important example, China alone
offers dozens. The number of such regimes seems, consequently, to exceed the number of
countries which exist in the world.
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It is also possible, however, that developed countries gain from de-
veloping countries' preferential tax regimes. Most obviously, the firms
that take advantage of the regimes presumably benefit from doing so, as
do their shareholders. It is not self-evident that the gains made by such
shareholders are outweighed by losses suffered by the populace gener-
ally. Moreover, to the extent that a less-developed country does not tax
income derived from within its jurisdiction, such income would appear
to be more readily available for taxation in the country of residence of
the firm or individual by whom it is derived. It is true that the developed
countries are mostly democratic; that their tax systems therefore repre-
sent (albeit less than perfectly) the democratically determined
preferences of their peoples; and that any undermining of these prefer-
ences by other countries' preferential regimes would amount to an
undermining of democracy. But it is also possible that the Leviathan hy-
pothesis is true (that democracy somehow produces a higher level of
taxation than would optimally satisfy the electorate),6 and if this is so,
other countries' preferential regimes might constrain developed coun-
tries' tax systems in such a way as to raise welfare in those countries.
The aim of this paper is to examine the theory that it is both desir-
able and feasible to prevent less-developed countries from operating
preferential tax regimes (that is, offering tax incentives) as a means of
attracting foreign investment. More specifically, the paper makes five
main points. First, the theory (proposed by the OECD and others) 7 that
the overall effect of preferential tax regimes is a lowering of global wel-
fare remains unproven. The theory that developing countries' preferential
tax regimes are harmful to the countries that operate them is even more
open to doubt. Second, even if developing countries' preferential regimes
are generally harmful to the countries that operate them, some of these
countries seem plainly to have benefited from doing so. Third, the theory
that developing countries should be prevented from operating preferen-
tial tax regimes requires some refinement. Even if such regimes were
invariably harmful to the countries that operate them (which seems not
to be the case), it is not clear that it is appropriate for a body such as the
OECD (dominated by G7 countries) to save them from themselves.
Given that some developing countries seem clearly to be benefiting from
their regimes, the appropriateness of OECD intervention is even less ap-
parent. Fourth, even if it is accepted that it would be desirable to prevent
6. See GEOFFREY BRENNAN & JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE POWER TO TAX: ANALYTI-
CAL FOUNDATIONS OF A FISCAL CONSTITUTION (1980); JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON
TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DE-
MOCRACY (1965); and JAMES M BUCHANAN & ROGER D CONGLETON, POLITICS BY PRINCIPLE,
NOT INTEREST: TOWARD NONDISCRIMINATORY DEMOCRACY (1998).
7. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, supra note 1, at 1675.
Fall 2004]
Michigan Journal of International Law
developing countries from operating preferential tax regimes, the practi-
calities of doing so seem to present difficulties (both technical and
political) which have yet to be resolved. Fifth, although some less-
developed countries have gained by operating preferential tax regimes,
others have not. The task remains, therefore, of determining how, if at
all, such countries might reform their tax systems so as to promote
growth (and, thus, alleviate poverty).
This paper consists of six main parts. The first of these recounts the
progress to date of the OECD's project on harmful tax competition. This
part concentrates on the OECD's plan to eliminate preferential tax regimes
in developing countries. It examines also the other two components of the
OECD project (these being its plans to eliminate such regimes in OECD
countries and also to eradicate tax havens), but only insofar as is necessary
to assess its attack on preferential regimes in developing countries.8
The second part of the paper examines the merit, in principle, of the
OECD project. Again, it concentrates on preferential regimes. In particu-
lar, this part of the paper assesses the theory, proposed by the OECD,
that eradicating harmful preferential tax regimes will raise global wel-
fare. The rationale for the OECD's campaign against tax havens is
assessed also, but only to the extent that it bears on the campaign against
preferential regimes.
The third part of the paper addresses some practical aspects of the
OECD project. It is suggested, in particular, that the OECD's manner of
operation has been opaque and in some respects arbitrary; that the Or-
ganization's approach to the identification of tax havens seems flawed;
and that, consequently, some havens seem to have escaped the OECD's
attentions. Perhaps more importantly (for present purposes, at least), the
OECD's approach to the identification of preferential regimes seems
8. See also Hugh Ault, Tax Competition: What (If Anything) To Do About It?, in 26
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE TAXATION: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF KLAUS VOGEL 1 (Paul
Kirchhof et al. eds., 2002); RAJIV BiSWAS, INTERNATIONAL TAX COMPETITION: GLOBALISA-
TION AND FISCAL SOVEREIGNTY (2002); WOLFGANG SCHON, TAX COMPETITION IN EUROPE(International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, Amsterdam, 2003); Reuven Avi-Yonah, Tax
Competition and E-Commerce, 23 TAX NOTES INT'L 1395 (2001); Reuven Avi-Yonah, Tax,
Trade, and Harmful Tax Competition: Reflections on the FSC Controversy, 21 Tax NOTES
INT'L 2841 (2000); Kimberly Carlson, When Cows Have Wings: An Analysis of the OECD's
Tax Haven Work as it Relates to Globalization, Sovereignty, and Privacy, 35 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 163 (2002); Frances M Homer, Do We Need an International Tax Organization?, 24 TAX
NOTES INT'L 179 (2001); Javier Salinas, The OECD Tax Competition Initiative: A Critique of
its Merits in the Global Marketplace, 25 Hous. J. INT'L L. 531 (2003); Miranda Stewart,
Global Trajectories of Tax Reform: The Discourse of Tax Reform in Developing and Transition
Countries, 44 HARV. INT'L L. J. 139 (2002); Alexander Townsend, Jr., Comment, The Global
Schoolyard Bully: The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Coercive
Efforts to Control Tax Competition, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 215 (2001); David R Burton,
Towards a Global Tax Cartel, POL'Y MAG. 9 (Summer 2002-03); and Terry Dwyer, The New
Fiscal Imperialism, POL'Y MAG. 12 (Summer 2002-03).
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unsatisfactory as does the distinction that the Organization draws be-
tween "harmful" and "harmless" preferential regimes.9
Parts four, five and six are much briefer. Part four of the paper exam-
ines the rhetoric that the OECD has used in support of its project. Part
five suggests, very tentatively, some factors that might help explain why
some preferential regimes seem to succeed and others to fail. And part
six examines the possibility that the eradication of preferential tax re-
gimes, if a worthwhile project, would be better undertaken by some
more representative body, such as the UN, rather than by the OECD.
The objective, throughout, is not only to assess the OECD project as
an end in itself but also to use such an assessment as a convenient means
of examining the theoretical case for and against developing countries'
use of tax incentives as a means of attracting foreign investment.
II. THE OECD PROJECT ON HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION
The OECD's project on harmful tax competition began in May 1996,
when the Organization's Member States called upon it "[to] develop
measures to counter the distorting effects of harmful tax competition on
investment and financing decisions and the consequences for national tax
bases, and report back in 1998.''1°
The stated aim was, thus, not to enquire into the effects of tax com-
petition. Rather, it was assumed that tax competition is harmful (in some
circumstances, at least) and that it could produce "distorting effects" (in
some circumstances, at least), and the aim was for the Organization to
"develop measures to counter" these effects. Moreover, it seems clear
that the OECD's Member States were concerned not with promoting
global welfare generally (let alone with the special needs of developing
countries trying to attract foreign investment) but with the fate of their
own treasuries-for the "national tax bases" to which they referred were
presumably not those of the countries (both within and outside the
OECD) engaging in "harmful tax competition" but those of its own
members who were not engaged in "harmful tax competition" (or who,
at least, were prepared to desist, if other members did likewise).
That the basic objective was to protect the OECD Member States'
revenues was confirmed by a communiqu6 subsequently issued by the
G7 countries. This expressed concern that "harmful tax competition"
9. The OECD itself seems not to use the word "harmless." Rather, it distinguishes
between those preferential regimes that are "harmful" and those that are "acceptable." See
OECD, 1998, supra note 2, at para. 4. This false dichotomy is but one of many usages belying
the Organization's tendency to regard G7 norms as applicable in the rest of the world.
10. Id. at para. 1.
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would lead to "the erosion of national tax bases"" and urged the OECD
"to vigorously pursue its work in this field, aimed at establishing a multi-
lateral approach under which countries could operate individually and
collectively to limit the extent of these practices.' 2
From the beginning, then, the stated objective of the OECD's tax
competition project was to facilitate some sort of coordinated action by
the G7 countries and other like-minded OECD members aimed at pre-
venting other countries-at this point unidentified-from engaging in
"harmful tax competition." That the OECD should act in the interest of
its members, and in the interest of the G7 countries in particular, is un-
surprising. Nor is it surprising that the OECD would subsequently seek
to present its project as being in the interest not only of its members but
of the world generally. But it is worth keeping in mind the origins of the
project, because the claim that it might benefit anyone other than the G7
countries and other like-minded OECD members is plainly self-serving
and, therefore, suspect.'3
That the G7 countries should have decided to act through the me-
dium of the OECD is unexceptional. Indeed, it could perhaps even be
said that orchestrating a project of this nature is exactly what the OECD
was set up to do.' 4 The origins of the project on harmful tax competition,
however, are murky, and the roles of the Organization and of its larger
members seem not to have been disclosed. The reason the OECD mem-
ber countries arranged for the Organization to undertake the project was
presumably that at least some of them had already determined that their
revenues were suffering, or were likely to suffer, as a result of harmful
11. Id. at para. 2.
12. Id.
13. It is possible that the interests of the OECD countries and those of the rest of the
world coincide. That is, it is possible that the OECD's argument is sound. But it is also possi-
ble that it is not. That is, it is possible that the project might benefit some countries only. This
is examined in part Ill of this paper.
14. Article I of the Paris Convention of 1960 (by which the OECD was established)
provides that the Organization's aim is
to promote policies designed:
(a) to achieve the highest sustainable economic growth and employment and a ris-
ing standard of living in Member countries, while maintaining financial stability,
and thus to contribute to the development of the world economy;
(b) to contribute to sound economic expansion in Member as well as non-member
countries in the process of economic development; and
(c) to contribute to the expansion of world trade on a multilateral, non-
discriminatory basis in accordance with international obligations.
Convention on Economic Cooperation and Development, Dec. 14, 1960, art.1, 12 U.S.T. 1728,
1732.
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tax competition. Presumably the larger countries, at least, had also al-
ready assessed not only the problem but also the range of possible
solutions, but their analyses seem not to have been published. It seems
reasonable to suppose also that, both before and after launching the
OECD on its project, the Organization's larger members might have in-
formally discussed these issues. Perhaps, too, they determined in
advance what they would find it helpful for the Organization to recom-
mend. Again, however, such proceedings seem not to be a matter of
public record.
The course of action ultimately recommended by the OECD is not
especially complex (though the potential political problems would seem
to be formidable). Indeed, it was reasonably predictable (in its technical
aspects, if not its political). It seems possible, then, that the purpose of
the project was not so much to perform the technical task of devising
solutions but to perform the political task of orchestrating broad, multi-
national political support for solutions already agreed in principle by the
OECD's larger members. But whether this is so is difficult to say be-
cause of the opaque nature of the Organization's proceedings.
A. The 1998 Report
In any event, the OECD's Committee on Fiscal Affairs (Committee)
duly "launched" its "project on harmful tax competition,"'5 and in Janu-
ary 1998 submitted a report on its work called Harmful Tax Competition:
An Emerging Global Issue (1998 Report). 16 In April 1998, the OECD
Council approved the 1998 Report. Switzerland and Luxembourg (the
OECD's two leading tax havens) abstained, 7 thus apparently confirming
that the "national tax bases" about which the Organization was con-
cerned were those of its members who were not engaged in "harmful tax
competition."' 8 The Council also instructed the Committee to "pursue its
work in this area and to develop a dialogue with non-member coun-
tries."'9
In the 1998 Report, the Committee identified two phenomena which
it categorized as "harmful tax practices." These were (1) "tax havens"
and (2) "harmful preferential tax regimes."20 By "tax havens," the OECD
15. OECD, 1998, supra note 2, at Foreword.
16. Id.
17. Id. at Foreword and Annex II: Statements by Luxembourg and Switzerland.
18. As will be seen, it was subsequently to transpire that most of the OECD Member
States (including five of the G7 countries) were operating preferential regimes. To be precise,
therefore, the OECD's concern was to protect the "national tax bases" of those of its members
who were prepared to cease their harmful tax practices if other countries would do likewise.
19. OECD, 1998, supra note 2, at Foreword.
20. Id. at para. 4.
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meant jurisdictions that impose no income taxes (or only nominal in-
come taxes) and that "offer themselves as places to be used by non-
residents to escape tax in their country of residence., 2' This coincides,
more or less, with normal usage. Even so, as will be seen, when the
Committee set out to define "tax haven," so as to draw up a list of them,
it found the concept troublingly elusive. Consequently, as will also be
seen, the result was to be less than satisfactory. In particular, some juris-
dictions which seem plainly to be tax havens escaped the list.
The term "harmful preferential tax regimes" is at least as problem-
atic. By it, the Committee meant countries that have a "normal '22 tax
system, but one that subjects specified classes of income to "low or no
taxation. 23 The targeted tax incentives with which developing countries
seek to attract foreign investment seem to constitute, in the eyes of the
OECD, "harmful tax competition." As will be seen, however, the
OECD's campaign against this form of harmful tax competition seems to
have encountered difficulties. Not the least of these is that the OECD
seems not to have satisfactorily distinguished between those preferential
regimes which are harmful and those which are not.
The 1998 Report covers: (1) countries which are members of the
OECD; (2) countries which are not; and also (3) non-sovereign depend-
ent territories. This last category predictably turned out to be crucial
because of the somewhat embarrassing prominence of exotic island de-
pendencies (mostly British) among the jurisdictions which the
Committee was subsequently to include on its list of tax havens.24 The
Committee made clear also that its concern was not that countries en-
gaged in "harmful tax practices" (that is, tax havens and harmful
preferential tax regimes) might suffer (as a result of a race to the bottom
or otherwise) but that "harmful tax competition" might "erode the tax
bases of other countries., 2 The Committee asserted too that harmful tax
competition "diminishes global welfare, 2 6 but it neither explained what
it meant by this nor offered any satisfactory evidence.27 The theory that
tax havens detract from global welfare seems, at worst, plausible. As will
21. Id. at para. 42.
22. Id. at para. 35.
23. OECD, 1998, supra note 2, at para. 40. The Committee did not define what it meant
by "low" and still has not.
24. See OECD, 2000, supra note 2, at para. 17.
25. OECD, 1998, supra note 2, at para. 4 (emphasis added).
26. Id.
27. Nor did the Committee provide any evidence that tax competition might harm other
countries' tax bases. As has been recounted, however, it was simply told by its members that
this was the case and instructed to devise solutions. What evidence the Organization's mem-
bers might have had for regarding tax competition as harmful to their revenues remains
unclear.
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be seen, however, the theory that preferential regimes have similar ef-
fects seems dubious in the extreme.
The Report concentrates on, as the Committee put it, "geographi-
cally mobile activities, such as financial and other service activities,
including the provision of intangibles., 2' As the Committee explained,
"[t]ax incentives designed to attract investment in plant, building and
equipment have been excluded at this stage.29 The Committee's recom-
mended strategy seems, then, to have been that the OECD should start
by picking off the easier targets (preferential regimes catering to finan-
cial services and also tax havens) and then, at some later stage, move on
to the politically more sensitive task of stopping developing countries
(and its own members) from using tax incentives to attract investment in
manufacturing. °
The Report consists of three main chapters. The first of these sur-
veys the phenomenon of global tax competition. The second contains the
Committee's suggestions as to how tax havens and harmful preferential
tax regimes should be identified. Finally, the third examines the methods
proposed by the Committee for "counteracting" harmful tax competition.
Eliminating tax havens and harmful preferential tax regimes would, of
course, require a large number of countries (most of them not members
of the OECD) to effect radical changes to their tax systems (and to vari-
ous other parts of their legal systems, such as the rules relating to bank
privacy). As one would expect, therefore, the Committee regarded it as
self-evident that this would require the application (or, at least, the
threatened application) against recalcitrant jurisdictions of "[s]evere
countermeasures" 31 and that these would need to be coordinated "at the
international level" 32 Indeed, as has been recounted, the reason the
OECD was instructed to launch the project was that the G7 countries had
already decided that multilateral measures were required.
B. Tax Havens
The Committee's basic function, then, was to propose methods, in-
cluding severe multilateral sanctions, by which the G7 and other like-
minded countries could eliminate tax havens and harmful preferential tax
regimes. This, of course, would require reasonably objective and defen-
sible methods of identifying what was to be eliminated. The Committee
28. OECD, 1998, supra note 2, at para. 6.
29. Id. (emphasis added).
30. To pave the way for this latter phase of the project, however, the Committee noted
that "the distinction between regimes directed at financial and other services on the one hand
and at manufacturing and similar activities on the other hand is not always easy to apply." Id.
31. Id. at para. 95.
32. Id. at para. 89.
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did not attempt to define either "tax haven" or "harmful preferential tax
regime," but it did devote substantial parts of its 1998 Report to the ques-
tion of how these phenomena might be recognized. It proposed that tax
havens should be identified principally by reference to four "key fac-
tors" 33 as follows:
1. "no or only nominal taxes (generally or in special circum-
stances);"34
2. "laws or administrative practices which prevent the effective
exchange of relevant information with other governments on
taxpayers benefiting from the low or no tax jurisdiction;, 31
3. "lack of transparency;, 36 and
4. the absence of any requirement for substantial activity. 37
Of these, the Committee regarded the first as most important: "[n]o or
only nominal taxation," it said, "is a necessary condition for the identifi-
cation of a tax haven.' 38 Indeed, low or only nominal taxation, combined
with "a situation where the jurisdiction offers or is perceived to offer
itself as a place where non-residents can escape tax in their country of
residence" could be "sufficient to identify a tax haven."3 9 Depending on
the circumstances, however, the other three "key factors" might also be
relevant.
C. Harmful Preferential Tax Regimes
The method by which the Committee proposed that the OECD
should identify "harmful preferential tax regimes" was likewise based on
four "key factors" (though not quite the same four), to which, however,
the Committee added (1) a further eight "other" factors and (2) three
"economic" considerations. The four "key" factors were as follows:
33. Id. at para. 52, Box I.
34. Id. at para. 52. The Committee did not explain what it meant by "nominal."
35. Id. "Low" was not defined. Governments commonly exchange information about
taxpayers so as to assist each other in the enforcement of their tax laws. Such exchanges are
typically specifically provided for by tax treaties (of which there are in the world about 1,500,
almost all of them bilateral and based on a model produced by the OECD) and conducted
pursuant to such provisions. Tax havens, however, generally do not participate in such ex-
changes; indeed, one of their attractions has traditionally been that they do not provide
information of this kind to other governments.
36. Id.
37. Id. What this was intended to mean is examined below.
38. Id.
39. Id. This approach would seem to lead to the identification as havens of a very large
number of countries, including, notably, the United States (in respect of the exemption from
tax of interest paid to non-residents). See infra note 81.
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1. a low or zero effective tax rate on specified kinds of income;4"
2. "ring-fencing;" '1
3. lack of transparency; 42 and
4. no effective exchange of information with other govern-
43
ments.
The eight "other" factors were as follows:
1. an "artificial" definition of the tax base;'
2. a failure to adhere to international transfer pricing princi-
ples;
45
3. the exemption of foreign-source income from tax;41
4. negotiable tax rates or tax bases;
47
5. the existence of secrecy provisions ;
4
1
6. access to a wide network of tax treaties; 9
40. OECD, 1998, supra note 2, at para. 61. The Committee did not define "low." It
explained that an "effective" tax rate might be lower than the formal rate "because of the way
in which a country defines the tax base" (Id. at Box II); but it did not explain how the OECD
might go about measuring the difference between formal and effective tax rates.
41. Id. at para. 62. By this the Committee meant where the preferential tax regime is
"partially or fully isolated from the domestic economy:" Id. Ring-fencing, the Committee
said, can take several forms, including (1) where the benefits of the regime are available only
to non-residents; and (2) where firms which benefit from the regime are "prohibited from
operating in the domestic market:" Id. at para. 62, Box II.
42. Id. at para. 63.
43. Id. at para. 64.
44. Id. at paras. 69-70. By "artificial" the Committee seems to have meant merely
narrower than is usual in major OECD countries. See id.
45. Id. at paras. 71-72. The Committee's assumption that its own principles are "inter-
national" and that all countries ought to "adhere" to them is typical of its tendency to assume
that the rest of the world ought generally to do things the way they are done in the OECD
countries.
46. Id. at para. 73. The Committee's assumption that foreign-sourced income should be
taxed is similarly typical of its assumption that the rest of the world should adopt OECD-style
tax systems. The theory that each country should confine its system of income tax to income
arising within its own territory is defensible on principled grounds. See, e.g., ROBERT E HALL
& ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX 75-77 (1995).
47. OECD, 1998, supra note 2, at para. 74. Negotiable tax rates can serve a number of
purposes. For example, a country might enact legislation taxing income at higher than nominal
rates (and so escape classification as a haven) but in fact allow taxpayers to pay tax at lower
rates or not at all (and so profit by in fact functioning as a haven without appearing to do so).
48. Id. at para. 75.
49. Id. at paras. 76-77. Some jurisdictions have built up networks of treaties so as to
make themselves attractive to foreign investors. This seems indeed to be one of the principal
functions for which the OECD's own model tax treaty was devised. Conversely, most havens
have few tax treaties because, (1) having no (or only nominal) income taxes, they have nothing
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7. the promotion of the regime as a tax minimization vehicle; °
and
8. the encouragement by the regime of purely tax-driven opera-
tions or arrangements.'
As with tax havens, a "low or zero effective tax rate" was regarded
by the Committee as "the necessary starting point,'5 2 but, said the Com-
mittee, an "evaluation" of a regime "should be based upon an overall
assessment" of each of the four key factors and also, "where relevant,"
the eight "other" factors. 3 The Committee said also that, in "examining"
a regime, it would be "helpful" to assess its "economic effects. 5 4 This, it
explained, could be done by posing the following three questions:
1. "Does the regime shift activity from one country to the coun-
try providing the preferential tax regime, rather than generate
significant new activity?
5
2. "Is the presence and level of activities in the host country
commensurate with the amount of investment or income?
5 6
3. "Is the preferential tax regime the primary motivation for the
location of an activity?
,5 7
The Committee indicated also that it expected preferential regimes
to be found both in countries belonging to the OECD and in other coun-
tries (whereas it appears to have anticipated not classifying any of its
own members as tax havens-the apparently clear cases of Switzerland
and Luxembourg notwithstanding).
D. Remedies
As I have recounted, the OECD's Member States initiated the pro-
ject in order to produce remedies (though exactly why remedies were
required they did not explain). It is not surprising, then, that the Commit-
to gain from treaties, and (2) they do not want to participate in the exchange of information.
Perhaps, then, this factor would be better reformulated. what seems to count is not so much
whether a country has "access to a wide range of treaties" as the detail of their provisions and
how they operate in practice.
50. Id. at para. 78. But any tax incentive, by definition, can serve as a means of mini-
mizing tax.
51. Id. at para. 79.
52. Id. at para. 61.
53. Id. at para. 59.
54. Id. at para. 80.
55. Id. at paras. 81-82.
56. Id. at para. 83.
57. Id. at para. 84.
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tee likewise regarded it as self-evident that remedies were required
(though it, too, did not explain precisely why). "Governments [said the
Committee] cannot stand back while their tax bases are eroded through
the actions of countries which offer taxpayers ways to exploit tax havens
and preferential regimes to reduce the tax that would otherwise have
been payable." 8
Various governments, it observed, were already using unilateral and
bilateral methods to protect their tax bases against the "detrimental ac-
tions" of other countries engaged in "harmful tax competition." But
these, it went on, were insufficient because the problem was "essentially
global in nature." 59 The Committee accordingly concluded that there was
a "need for coordinated action at the international level."
6
The Committee went on to make a series of nineteen recommenda-
tions, some concerning domestic legislation; some concerning tax
treaties; and some concerning the "intensification of international coop-
eration.' 6 Those which, for present purposes, it is necessary to examine
were as follows:
1. that countries without controlled foreign corporation (CFC)
rules should consider adopting them;
62
58. Id. at para. 85.
59. Id. at para. 87. By this the Committee meant that unilateral or bilateral responses
are likely to be inadequate. The reasons for this, in turn, the Committee expressed as follows:
First, the jurisdictional limits to the powers of a country's tax authorities restrict the
ability of those authorities to counter some forms of harmful tax competition. Sec-
ond, a country may believe that taxing its residents in a way that neutralizes the
benefits of certain forms of harmful tax competition will put its taxpayers at a com-
petitive disadvantage if its action is not followed by other countries. Third, the
necessity to monitor all forms of harmful tax competition and to enforce counter-
measures effectively imposes significant administrative costs on countries adversely
affected by such competition. Fourth, uncoordinated, unilateral measures may in-
crease compliance costs on taxpayers.
Id.
60. Id. at para. 89.
61. Id. at para. 92.
62. Id. at paras. 97-100. CFC rules (controlled foreign corporation rules) are rules
providing for the taxation of persons resident within a jurisdiction on offshore income accu-
mulated in offshore corporations. In the absence of such rules, such income is generally not
taxable because it is neither derived by a resident nor derived from the jurisdiction. Most
OECD countries' taxing statutes contain such rules. In almost all cases, however, the CFC
rules are not comprehensive. For example, it is common for such rules to apply only to passive
income. For an account of the US CFC rules, see, for example, chapter 15 of JOSEPH ISEN-
BERGH, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION, (2000). For a more general account, see Roy ROHATGI,
BASIC INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 374-95 (2002). For a survey of a large number of jurisdic-
tions' CFC rules, see Mattias Dahlberg, Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by
Multinational Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, 86b CAHIERS DE DROIT
FISCAL INT'L 827 (2001). It is notable that the OECD did not recommend that all countries
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2. that countries without foreign investment fund (FIF) rules
should consider adopting them;
63
3. that countries whose tax systems are confined to domestic in-
come should extend them to cover offshore income; '
4. that all countries should follow the OECD's transfer pricing
guidelines;5
5. that the OECD Member States should establish a Forum, sub-
ordinate to the Committee, to "undertake an on-going
evaluation of existing and proposed [tax] regimes in member
and non-member countries... ;"6
6. that the Forum should draw up a list of tax havens;
6
7. that the Forum should draw up a list of OECD Member
States' harmful preferential tax regimes;68
8. that OECD Member States should "remove ... the harmful
features of their preferential tax regimes" within five years;
69
and
should actually adopt CFC rules but only that they should consider doing so. It seems, then,
that the OECD does not require all countries to adopt CFC rules (presumably because, in the
case of countries which are either very small or very poor, the establishment of such rules
would be disproportionately burdensome and in any event probably unworkable) but might
look with some undisclosed degree of disfavor upon countries that do not (at least in some
circumstances). It seems likely that this kind of imprecision, coupled as it is with threats of
sanctions for non-compliance, is seen in non-OECD countries without CFC rules as unsettling
and overbearing and that it will consequently undermine the perceived legitimacy of the
OECD's project.
63. OECD, 1998, supra note 2, at paras. 101-03. FIF rules (Foreign Investment Fund
rules) are rules imposing tax on persons resident within a jurisdiction on income accumulated
in offshore entities. The main difference between CFC regimes and FIF regimes is that FIF
regimes apply irrespective of control (whereas CFC rules apply only to entities controlled by a
small number of persons-for example, five-resident within the taxing jurisdiction). Again,
it is notable that the OECD did not recommend that all countries should adopt FIF rules but
only that they should consider doing so. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
64. OECD, 1998, supra note 2, at paras. 104-05. See also supra note 46 and accompa-
nying text.
65. OECD, 1998, supra note 2, at para. 111. Once more, the OECD has assumed that it
is appropriate to formulate standards, to exclude most of the world from the process of formu-
lation, and then to require the countries excluded to comply.
66. Id. at paras. 140-48.
67. Id. at paras. 149-51.
68. Id. at paras. 149-51, Box III.
69. Id. The 5 year period was to run from the date on which the OECD Council ap-
proved the guidelines. See id. at Guideline 3, Box II1. This happened on 9 April 1998. See id.
at Foreword. The 5 years, therefore, ended in April 2003. There was also a "grandfathering"
provision, according to which preferential regimes could continue to operate until 31 Decem-
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9. that the Forum should "engage in a dialogue" with countries
outside the OECD, with the aim generally of advancing the
project on harmful tax competition.7 °
The Report finished with a list of seven "topics for further study."
71
All were further possible multilateral measures, which, the Committee
said, it might be necessary to recommend in the future. They included
restrictions on the deductibility of payments to tax haven entities,72 with-
holding taxes on certain payments to residents of countries engaging in
harmful tax competition, 73 and, not least, "the possibility of addressing
harmful tax competition using a wide range of non-tax measures
74
(though the Committee said nothing about what sorts of non-tax meas-
ures might be effective or appropriate).
E. The 2000 Report
In 2000, the Committee on Fiscal Affairs submitted to the Organiza-
tion a second report called Towards Global Tax Co-operation: Report to
the 2000 Ministerial Council Meeting and Recommendations by the
Committee on Fiscal Affairs: Progress in Identifying and Eliminating
Harmful Tax Practices (2000 Report).75 This contained a list of forty-
seven "potentially harmful preferential tax regimes" in OECD member
76countries. 6 More importantly, for present purposes, it contained also a
list of thirty-five jurisdictions that, the Committee said, satisfied its "cri-
teria for being tax havens. 77 The 2000 Report said very little, however,
about preferential regimes in non-member countries.
F. Preferential Tax Regimes in Member Countries
The Forum proposed by the Committee78 was duly established. Once
in being, it requested each OECD member country to perform a "self-
review" to identify any aspects of its tax system which would constitute
a preferential tax regime according to the criteria formulated by the
Committee in 1998.79 This process determined that most OECD
ber 2005 but only for the benefit of taxpayers benefiting from them on 31 December 2000. See
id. at Guideline 3, Box HI.
70. Id. at para. 156.
71. Id. at paras. 157-71.
72. Id. at paras. 158-59.
73. Id. at paras. 160-61.
74. Id. at paras. 171.
75. OECD, 2000, supra note 2.
76. Id. at para. 11.
77. Id. at pg. 6 and para. 17.
78. See OECD, 1998, supra note 2, at paras. 140-48.
79. OECD, 2000, supra note 2, at para. 5.
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members were operating potentially harmful preferential regimes of one
kind or another. In all, there were forty-seven such regimes, operated by
the following countries: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Korea, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey,
and the United States.80 The only member countries not operating prefer-
ential tax regimes were, therefore, Denmark, the United Kingdom,
Japan, New Zealand, Mexico, the Czech Republic, and Poland. The
forty-seven regimes provided for preferential tax treatment for a range of
activities, such as banking, insurance, financing, shipping, operating a
corporate headquarters, and so on.8 The number of regimes was greater
than the number of countries because some countries operated more than
one regime. Canada, for example, appeared on the list three times as it
operated regimes catering to: (1) international banking; (2) international
shipping; and (3) non-resident owned investment corporations.82 Now
that the Committee had completed this provisional list of "potentially"
harmful regimes, it confirmed that the next step would be for the coun-
tries concerned to identify which of them were, or might be, "actually"
harmful.83 These countries would then have until April 2003 to eliminate
these regimes' "harmful features."
As explained above, the process was confined to regimes catering to
"financial and other services;" the task of identifying preferential tax
regimes available to manufacturers was left for another day.
80. Id. at para. 11.
81. Id. Most countries, including OECD countries, treat interest derived by non-
residents more generously than interest derived by residents. That is, in most countries, inter-
est derived by a non-resident is either not taxed at all or taxed at a lower rate than it would be
if derived by a resident. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, supra note 1, at 1576:
Since the United States abolished its withholding tax on interest paid to foreigners
in 1984, no major capital-importing country has been able to impose such a tax for
fear of driving mobile capital elsewhere (or increasing the cost of capital for domes-
tic borrowers, including the government itself). As a result, individuals can
generally earn investment income free of host-country taxation in any of the world's
major economies.
See also ROHATGI, supra note 62, at 197-200. It seems, however, that the OECD does not
regard such favorable treatment as constituting a preferential regime. This seems odd because
it seems to satisfy the OECD's own criteria. See supra notes 40 to 57. The OECD seems not to
have explained why it does not regard the preferential treatment of interest paid to non-
residents as a preferential regime, let alone a harmful one.
82. OECD, 2000, supra note 2, at para. 11.
83. Id. at Executive Summary (page 6).
84. OECD, 1998, supra note 2, at para. 6.
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G. The OECD's List of Tax Havens
The Forum began the task of identifying tax havens by drawing up a
list of jurisdictions which, it said, "appeared to have the potential" for
satisfying the tax haven criteria devised by the Committee in 1998.85 The
OECD has not published this list, though the 1998 Report does reveal
that the number of jurisdictions on it was forty-seven. 6 The Forum then
undertook "an in-depth factual review" of these forty-seven jurisdictions,
a process in which "the full participation of each jurisdiction was invited
and encouraged. 87 Six of the jurisdictions reviewed by the Forum (Ber-
muda, the Cayman Islands, Cyprus, Malta, Mauritius, and San Marino)88
"committed" themselves "to eliminate their harmful tax practices and to
comply with the principles of the 1998 Report."89 This was called an
"advance commitment." 9 These jurisdictions were excluded from the list
of tax havens. Another six jurisdictions were excluded also, on the basis
that, on closer inspection, they turned out not to satisfy the criteria. The
identity of these jurisdictions was not disclosed (and seems still not to
have been disclosed). The result of this process was a list of thirty-five
jurisdictions classified as tax havens.9'
Until this point, the OECD's project on harmful tax competition had
been conducted entirely in terms of abstract concepts (or, at least, the
public record of the project had been so conducted). It is therefore nec-
essary to name the thirty-five tax havens, so as to give a more concrete
idea of the project on which the Organization had embarked. They were
as follows: Andorra; Anguilla; Antigua and Barbuda; Aruba; the Baha-
mas; Bahrain; Barbados; Belize; the British Virgin Islands; the Cook
Islands; Dominica; Gibraltar; Grenada; Guernsey, Sark and Alderney;
the Isle of Man; Jersey; Liberia; Liechtenstein; the Maldives; the Mar-
shall Islands; Monaco; Montserrat; Nauru; the Netherlands Antilles;
Niue; Panama; Samoa; the Seychelles; St Lucia; St Christopher and Ne-
vis; St Vincent and the Grenadines; Tonga; the Turks and Caicos; the
U.S. Virgin Islands; and Vanuatu.92 Most of these are very small. Some
are extremely small. Niue, for example, is a small island in the South
Pacific with a population of about 2,000.9' Some are rich-for example,
85. Id. at para. 8.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 29. See also OECD, 2001, supra note 2, at para. 17.
89. OECD, 2000, supra note 2, at para. 17.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. U.N. DEP'T OF ECONOMIC & SOCIAL AFFAIRS, 2000 U.N. DEMOGRAPHIC Y.B. 121
(2002).
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the Channel Islands (Jersey, Guernsey, Sark and Alderney) 94 and
Monaco.95 Others-for example, Liberia and Niue-are very poor; their
populations consist mainly of subsistence farmers.96
The Committee emphasized that the list of tax havens was not in-
tended "as the basis for possible coordinated defensive measures."97
Rather, the intention was to develop a further list of "uncooperative" tax
havens for this purpose.98 This the Committee proposed to do by July 31,
2001. 99 Every jurisdiction on the list of tax havens would automatically
be included on the proposed new list.' °° Other jurisdictions found to be
tax havens would be included on it also.'O But any jurisdiction appearing
on the list of uncooperative tax havens (or about to appear on it) could
have itself removed (or preempt its appearance) by making a "commit-
ment" to the OECD to eliminate its harmful tax practices.0 2 Jurisdictions
making such a commitment, and sticking to it, would not be subjected to
coordinated sanctions. To preempt prevarication, the Committee stipu-
lated that a jurisdiction making a commitment would also have to work
in collaboration with the Forum to produce a detailed plan incorporating
a timetable and "milestones to ensure steady progress;"'0 3 it would have
to complete "a significant and concrete action during the first year; ' '°
and it would have to "engage in an annual review process with the Fo-
rum to determine the progress made."'0 5
94. Neither the UN nor the World Bank seems to have published economic data on the
Channel islands. According to the CIA, however, per capita GDP at purchasing power parity
in 1999 was US$24,800 in Jersey and US$20,000 in Guernsey. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY, WORLD FACTBOOK (2004) at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/
je.html and http://www.cia.gov/cia/ publications/factbook/geos/gk.html.
95. Neither the UN nor the World Bank seems to have published economic data on
Monaco. According to the CIA, however, per capita GDP at purchasing power parity in 1999
was US$27,000. This figure was accompanied however by the observation that Monaco "does
not publish national income figures" and the caution that the CIA's estimate was "extremely
rough." CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, WORLD FACTBOOK (2004) at http://www.cia.gov/
cia/publications/factbook/geos/mn/html (last visited Oct. 19, 2004). See also U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, BACKGROUND NOTE: MONACO (Mar.
2004) at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgnl3397.htm.
96. According to the World Bank, per capita GDP in Liberia in 2003 was US$192.
WORLD BANK, LIBERIA DATA PROFILE, WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS ONLINE, at http://
devdata.worldbank.org./query.
97. OECD, 2000, supra note 2, at para. 17.
98. Id. at para. 19.
99. Id. at paras. 17-23.
100. Id. at para. 19.
101. Id.
102. Id. at paras. 20-23.
103. Id. at para. 21.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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Satisfactory annual reviews would mean that the jurisdiction would
stay off the list of uncooperative tax havens, but any jurisdiction failing
to adhere to its timetable or showing any sign of "not acting in good faith
in accordance with its commitments" would find itself back on the list.
'06
Conversely, any jurisdiction appearing on the list would be able at any
time to make the requisite commitment and so be removed from it. A
jurisdiction would also have its name removed from the list if it ceased
to meet the tax haven criteria, whether it made the commitment or not.107
H. Preferential Tax Regimes in Non-Member Countries
From the OECD's point of view, preferential tax regimes in non-
member countries would seem to be at least as large a problem as either
preferential regimes in member countries or tax havens. One might,
therefore, have expected the Committee to explain why it said so little
about them in its 2000 Report, but it did not. It can perhaps be inferred
that the Committee had made little progress in this aspect of its work.
Havens are more manifestly objectionable than preferential regimes.
Moreover, most tax havens are small and weak, whereas a number of the
non-OECD countries operating preferential regimes (or, at least, whose
tax systems feature incentives apparently constituting preferential tax
regimes) are large and powerful-for example, China.' 8 It seems reason-
able to surmise that, for these reasons, the Committee decided to
concentrate on havens and to leave for another day the more difficult
problem of non-member countries' preferential regimes. As for the
elimination of the OECD member countries' own preferential regimes,
this was presumably regarded as both easier and politically necessary-
for it was (and remains) not only an end in itself but also presumably a
prerequisite to the larger objective of eliminating such regimes in non-
member countries. The reason is that it would obviously be difficult for
the OECD to move against non-member countries' preferential regimes
without first putting its own house in order. The 2000 Report did, how-
ever, contain this statement.
106. Id. at para. 22.
107. Id. at paras. 17-23.
108. Whether the OECD regards China (or any other particular non-OECD country) as
operating preferential regimes remains unclear, because the Organization has not publicly
expressed an opinion on this point. But a number of large countries, including China, appear
to satisfy the OECD's criteria for operating harmful preferential regimes. On 14 June 2004,
the OECD announced that China would become an "observer" on the OECD's Committee on
Fiscal Affairs and so "intensify [its] cooperation with the OECD." See China, South Africa to
participate in Work of OECD's Committee on Fiscal Affairs, OECD, June 14, 2004, at
http://www.oecd.org/document/21/0,2340,en_2649_34487_32074069-1-_1-_1_1 ,00.html (June
14, 2004). South Africa, Russia and Argentina are also observers on the Committee on Fiscal
Affairs.
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Some non-member economies feature strongly in the global fi-
nancial marketplace, with possibly major distortions being
caused by the harmful tax practices they have put in place. There
is a significant risk that a failure to address these practices in
parallel with the work in relation to Member countries will cause
a shift of the targeted activities to economies outside the OECD
area, giving them an unwarranted competitive advantage and
limiting the effectiveness of the whole exercise."
This rather vague passage was presumably directed at non-member
countries' preferential regimes (for havens and member countries' pref-
erential regimes were both dealt with explicitly, as outlined above). The
analysis seems sound enough (leaving aside for the moment the Com-
mittee's unexplained assumption that the shifting of economic activity
from OECD countries to non-member countries would be a bad thing),
but the Committee neither named the jurisdictions it had in mind nor
indicated any progress at all in identifying them.
I. Remedies (Again)
In its 2000 Report, the Committee reiterated its call for collective ac-
tion against harmful tax competition." ° To coordinate such action was,
after all, what it had been called upon to do."' The Committee now pro-
posed a new list of measures that might be collectively directed at
uncooperative tax havens.' This generally restated proposals already
made in the 1998 Report. "3 It also contained some new proposals, such
as the imposition of "transactions" charges on certain (unspecified)
transactions involving uncooperative tax havens." 4 Also, in 2000, the
Committee positively recommended some of the strategies which in
1998 it had regarded as requiring further study."5 In particular, it now
advocated both restrictions on the deductibility of payments to tax haven
entities and the imposition of withholding taxes on certain (but unspeci-
fied) payments to residents of tax havens." 6 The Committee also gave
some substance to its previously vague suggestion that "non-tax meas-
ures" could be brought to bear on recalcitrant tax havens:'1 7 it now
suggested that these might include the withholding of "non-essential
109. OECD, 2000, supra note 2, at para. 29.
110. Id. at Executive Summary.
111. OECD, 1998, supra note 2, at paras. 1-2.
112. OECD, 2000, supra note 2, at para. 35.
113. OECD, 1998, supra note 2, at paras. 157-71.
114. OECD, 2000, supra note 3, at para. 35.
115. OECD, 1998, supra note 2, at paras. 157-71.
116. OECD, 2000, supra note 2, at para. 35.
117. OECD, 1998, supra note 2 at paras. 149-51.
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economic assistance. '""' This would presumably provide considerable
leverage in the case of havens dependent on such aid such as, for exam-
ple, the Cook Islands. Richer havens-Monaco, for example-seem
unlikely to have been much perturbed.
J. The 2001 Report
In 2001, the Committee submitted its third report (2001 Report). It
was called simply The OECD's Project on Harmful Tax Practices: The
2001 Progress Report,"9 but its principal message seems to be that not
much progress has been made. The Committee did not actually concede
that this was so, but it seems clear that the project, having moved on
from the easy world of theoretical generalities to the hard business of
specific applications, was making less progress than had been envisaged.
Even within the OECD, support seems to have been fragmenting. As
before, Switzerland and Luxembourg abstained. This time, though, Bel-
gium and Portugal abstained too. 20 The smaller Member States, it seems,
were feeling squeezed.
The 2001 Report is notable also for displaying a new-found enthusi-
asm for tax competition. The Committee had previously been careful to
direct its project not at all tax competition but only at competition which
it characterized as "harmful" (though, as I have mentioned, the Commit-
tee had left the distinction between harmful and harmless tax
competition troublingly vague). In other words, it had effectively ac-
knowledged that not all tax competition is harmful. It had also, however,
been notably unenthusiastic about tax competition of any kind. In its
2001 Report, in contrast, the Committee presented the OECD as seeking
"to promote tax competition" so as to "foster economic growth and de-
velopment world-wide."'
2
'
The point of the project, the Committee went on, was to ensure that
tax competition was not only "free" but also "fair."'22 This marked an
intriguing change of emphasis-or, at least, of terminology. The 2001
Report recounted also that the jurisdictions on the list of tax havens had
118. OECD, 2000, supra note 2, at para. 36.
119. OECD, 2001, supra note 2.
120. Id. at 4, n. 1, which consists of this statement:
Belgium and Portugal abstain from this Report. Luxembourg recalls its abstention
to the 1998 Report, Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue, which
also applies to the present Report and regrets that the 2001 progress report is further
away from the goal of combating harmful tax competition with respect to the loca-
tion of economic activities. In addition, Switzerland notes that its 1998 abstention
applies to any follow up work undertaken since 1998.
121. Id. at para. 3.
122. Id.
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objected to some aspects of the campaign against them.'23 Moreover,
small and weak though they were, they had won significant conces-• 124
sions. As for the other two central parts of the project-preferential
regimes in member and non-member countries-the 2001 Report said
virtually nothing about either of them. Some important havens, as I have
recounted, were not even on the OECD's list. The Committee presuma-
bly intended to treat these jurisdictions as operating harmful preferential
regimes, but its work on preferential regimes seems to have ground to a
halt. Or, at least, if progress had been made, it was not mentioned in the
2001 Report.
K. Concessions to Tax Havens
As I have explained, the OECD proposed to identify tax havens
principally by reference to four key factors. The first of these was the
imposition of "no or nominal taxes on the relevant income.' 25 One might
have inferred, therefore, that in order to have itself taken off the list of
uncooperative tax havens, a jurisdiction might be required to tax income
and to tax it at more than nominal rates. In its 2001 Report, however, the
Committee was concerned to emphasize that this was not its intention.
"The no or nominal tax criterion [it said] is not sufficient, by itself, to
result in characterization as a tax haven. The OECD recognizes that
every jurisdiction has a right to determine whether to impose direct taxes
and, if so, to determine the appropriate tax rate.' 26
The Committee gave ground on the fourth key factor also. This was
originally expressed, in 1998, as "the absence of a requirement that the
activity be substantial." Exactly what was meant by this is unclear. In
2000, the Committee reworded this "factor" as follows: "the jurisdiction
facilitates the establishment of foreign-owned entities without the need
123. Id. at paras. 23-35.
124. Id. The havens targeted by the OECD (most of which, as I have observed, were
small, poor, and politically uninfluential) appear to have regarded the OECD project as un-
principled and unfair because the OECD, whilst targeting them (the listed havens) appeared to
be ignoring: (1) the OECD's own havens (Switzerland and Luxembourg); (2) the OECD coun-
tries which, whilst not generally regarded as havens, have tax systems which can be and are
used as havens in some circumstances (for example, the non-taxation by the United States of
interest paid to non-residents); and (3) various other "offshore financial centers" such as Hong
Kong and Singapore. See, e.g., Letter from Rene R. Harris, President of Nauru, to Donald J.
Johnston, Secretary-General, OECD (Dec. 3 2003), at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/19/18/
21842603.pdf. See also OECD, THE OECD's PROJECT ON HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES: A
BRIEFING NOTE FOR JOURNALISTS (Mar. 22, 2004), at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/63/
30930917.pdf. See also OECD, A PROCESS FOR ACHIEVING A GLOBAL LEVEL PLAYING FIELD
(June 4, 2 004).at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/ 13/0/31967501 .pdf.
125. OECD, 2000, supra note 2, at para. 7, n. 4. The OECD has not explained what is
meant by "nominal" or "relevant" in this context.
126. OECD, 2001, supra note 2, at para. 16 (emphasis in original).
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for a local substantive presence or prohibits these entities from having
any commercial impact on the local economy."'127 This seems an im-
provement but still obscure-for many jurisdictions that are not tax
havens impose restrictions on the establishment of corporations by for-
eigners, 12 and some tax havens are indifferent as to whether corporations
owned by foreigners engage in local activity. 29 In 2001, the Committee
explained that "in interpreting the no substantial activities criterion, the
Forum sought to determine whether there were factors that discouraged
substantial domestic activities."' 30 Again, however, some havens are in-
different to whether corporations owned by foreigners engage in local
activity. In any event, whatever this fourth factor was supposed to mean,
the tax havens on the OECD's list objected to it, and the Committee re-
sponded by downgrading its significance.
Its resulting status is unclear. It seems that the Committee still re-
gards factors discouraging to substantial domestic activity as relevant to
the identification of tax havens, but it no longer regards such factors as
key. Moreover, it no longer requires tax havens to modify this aspect of
their tax systems. This relaxation was retrospective. That is, tax havens
that had already given a commitment to eliminate their "no substantial
activity" requirements were released from it.'
L. Transparency and the Exchange of Information
The OECD thus does not object to countries not taxing income. And
it no longer objects to countries permitting the establishment of foreign-
owned entities whilst discouraging them from engaging in substantial
activity in the local economy. This leaves only the second and third key
factors; that is, the OECD now requires tax havens only (1) to ensure
that their tax systems are transparent and (2) to provide for the effective
exchange of information. Any jurisdiction satisfying these two criteria
will not be classified as uncooperative.
In its 2001 Report, the Committee elaborated on both of these re-
quirements. It had made considerable progress in operationalizing these
previously vague concepts. The transparency requirement it explained as
follows:
127. OECD, 2000, supra note 2, at para. 7, n. 4.
128. A good example is China. See, e.g., KENNETH A. LANCASTER, TAXATION AND IN-
VESTMENT IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (2003).
129. A good example is Hong Kong. See, e.g., PHILIP SMART & ANDREW HALKYARD,
TRADE AND INVESTMENT LAW IN HONG KONG (1993).
130. OECD, 2001, supra note 2, at para. 27.
131. Id. at para. 29.
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By committing to transparency, a jurisdiction agrees that there
will be no non-transparent features of its tax system, such as
rules that depart from established laws and practices within the
jurisdiction, "secret" tax rulings or the ability of persons to "ne-
gotiate" the rate of tax to be applied. Transparency also requires
financial accounts to be audited or filed. Exceptions to this stan-
dard may be warranted where the transactions of an entity are de
minimis or the entity is engaged solely in local activities and
does not have foreign ownership, beneficiaries, management or
other involvement. A committing jurisdiction also agrees that its
governmental authorities should have access to beneficial own-
ership information regarding the ownership of all types of
entities and to bank information that may be relevant to criminal
and civil tax matters.1
32
As regards the exchange of information, the Committee observed:
By committing to effective exchange of information, a jurisdic-
tion agrees to establish a mechanism for the effective exchange
of information that includes the following elements. The com-
mitment ensures that there is a legal mechanism in place that
allows information to be given to a tax authority of another
country in response to a request for information that may be
relevant to a specific tax inquiry. An essential element of effec-
tive exchange of information is the implementation of
appropriate safeguards to ensure that the information obtained
and provided is used only for the purposes for which it was
sought. The adequate protection of taxpayers' rights and the con-
fidentiality of their tax affairs is essential to preserving the
integrity and effectiveness of exchange of information programs
.... In the case of information requested for the investigation
and prosecution of a criminal tax matter, the information should
be provided without a requirement that the conduct being inves-
tigated would constitute a crime under the laws of the requested
jurisdiction if it occurred in that jurisdiction. In the case of in-
formation requested in the context of a civil tax matter, the
requested jurisdiction should provide information without regard
to whether or not the requested jurisdiction has an interest in ob-
taining the information for its own domestic tax purposes. The
committing jurisdiction is also asked to agree that it will have
administrative practices in place so that the legal mechanism for
132. Id. at para. 37. On negotiable tax rates, see supra note 47.
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exchange of information will function effectively and can be
monitored.'33
Work was continuing, the Committee said, on determining "the
types of information that should be available for exchange" and "the
means by which the information could be obtained.'
34
M. Timing
The timetable originally proposed by the Committee would have had
the effect of requiring tax havens to eliminate their harmful tax practices
before the OECD Member States were obliged to eliminate theirs. The
havens complained that this was unfair. The Committee accepted this
complaint and modified the timetable for havens so as to bring it into
line with that for OECD members. This meant that havens and OECD
members were all required to eliminate their harmful tax practices by 31
December 2005.
As has been recounted, the Committee did not report any progress at
all in even identifying the harmful preferential regimes operated by non-
OECD members. Presumably it had not yet begun the job of attempting
to extract from the governments concerned commitments to eliminate
their preferential tax regimes' "harmful features." In any event, although
the Committee provided timetables for havens and OECD members to
eliminate their harmful tax practices, it provided no timetable for non-
OECD members (other than havens) to do the same.
N. The OECD 's List of Uncooperative Tax Havens
In April 2002, the OECD duly published its list of uncooperative tax
havens. Tlhere were only seven of them: Andorra, Liechtenstein, Liberia,
133. OECD, 2001, supra note 2, para. 38.
134. Id. at para. 42. The question of the types of information which countries are to be
required to exchange is crucial and difficult. The achievement of the OECD's objectives would
seem to require havens to collate an enormous volume of information of kinds that they cur-
rently do not collect at all. Indeed, it seems probable that complying with the OECD's
requirements will be beyond the current administrative capacity of at least some of the listed
havens-even if they were enthusiastic partners in the project. In fact, they are unenthusiastic;
by the OECD's own reckoning, they will suffer as a result of ceasing to function as havens,
and the taxpayers (or tax evaders) about whom they will be expected to collect information
have an obvious interest in not providing it. Given that the number of havens is large and that
many of them are remote, achieving even the OECD's revised objectives would appear to
present formidable difficulties. The OECD has offered to "assist" (see OECD, 2000, supra
note 2, at paras. 26-27, 30) but the nature and scale of such assistance remains unclear. The
extent to which governments requesting information from other governments would pay for it
remains unclear.
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Monaco, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, and Vanuatu.' 3 The other jurisdic-
tions designated as havens had all, it seems, either ceased their harmful
tax practices (for example, Tonga)'36 or made commitments, in terms ac-
ceptable to the OECD, to do so (for example, Anguilla).' 37 In May 2003,
Vanuatu made the commitment asked of it and so was removed from the
list.' 38 In December 2003, Nauru did the same and so was likewise re-
moved. 39 There thus remain only five jurisdictions on the OECD's list of
uncooperative tax havens: Andorra, Liechtenstein, Liberia, Monaco, and
the Marshall Islands. 140
0. The 2004 Report
In 2004, the Committee submitted its fourth report, called simply
The OECD's Project on Harmful Tax Practices: The 2004 Progress Re-
port (2004 Report). In it, the Committee reported significant progress
in its work on eliminating harmful preferential regimes in OECD Mem-
ber States and information exchange with havens. Perhaps most notably,
the Committee reported that of its own Member-States' preferential re-
135. See generally Press Release, OECD, The OECD Issues the List of Uncooperative
Tax Havens (Apr. 18 2002), at http://www.oecd.org/document/19/0,2340,en 2649_
33745_2082323_119690 l.1 1 37427,00.html. See also Press Release, OECD, The OECD List
of Uncooperative Tax Havens-A Statement by the Chair of the OECD's Committee on Fiscal
Affairs, Gabriel Makhouf (Apr. 18, 2002), at http://www.oecd.org/document/19/
0,2340,en_2649_33745_2082323_119690 1 1_37427,00.html.
136. Press Release, OECD, Tonga No Longer Tax Haven (Aug. 23, 2001).
137. Press Release, OECD, Anguilla and Turks and Caicos Islands Commit to Cooperate
with OECD to Address Harmful Tax Practices (Mar. 8, 2002).
138. Press Release, OECD, Vanuatu Makes Commitment and is Removed from OECD
List of Uncooperative Tax Havens (May 20, 2003), at http://www.oecd.org/document/31/
0,2340,en_2649_201185_21863583_1_l1,00.html.
139. Press Release, OECD, Nauru is Removed from OECD List of Uncooperative Tax
Havens (Dec. 12, 2003), at http://www.oecd.org/document/31/0,2340,en_2649_201185_
21863583_l 111,00.htm.
140. It does not follow, of course, that the number of tax havens in the world has been
reduced to five. On the contrary, many of the jurisdictions which have made the commitment
required by the OECD seem in fact still to be operating as havens. Published data on such
operations seem to be virtually non-existent, but this is unsurprising given that these jurisdic-
tions seem to be attempting to operate as havens whilst simultaneously assuring the OECD
and its members that they are not, and the taxpayers using these jurisdictions as tax havens
have at least as strong an interest as the jurisdictions' govemments in not publicizing their
activities. Similarly, a number of jurisdictions which were omitted from the original list of
havens are continuing to operate as havens. Examples include Hong Kong, Singapore, and
Switzerland. This would appear to present the Organization with a dilemma. If it restores (or
adds) these jurisdictions to its list of uncooperative havens, the list will grow, and the project
will appear to be going backwards. If it does not, these jurisdictions will presumably remain
free to function as havens, and the project will in fact be going backwards.
141. See OECD, 2004, supra note 2. See also Robert Goulder, TNI Interview: Jeffrey
Owens, 33 TAX NOTES INT'L 1189 (2004); Cordia Scott, OECD Unveils Progress Report on
Harmful Tax Regimes, 33 TAX NOTES INT'L 1151 (2004). Owens is the head of the OECD's
Centre for Tax Policy and Administration.
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gimes, all had either: (1) been abolished; (2) been amended to remove
their "potentially harmful features;" or (3) been found to be "not harm-
ful. ' 142 The Committee did not report much progress in its work on
preferential regimes in non-member States, but it did contain this state-
ment: "With the progress made on other aspects of the work, the
Committee will now be able to focus and accelerate its work in this
area." 
43
It would seem, then, that work on the most difficult, most problem-
atic, most important, and potentially most counter-productive part of the
project is about to begin. It remains unclear, however, whether the
OECD's plan is to continue on the basis of confining the project to ser-
vices' or whether it will at this juncture broaden it so as to cover
manufacturing also.
III. THE MERITS OF THE OECD PROJECT
The two basic components of the OECD project-tax havens and
preferential regimes-raise different issues; their merits must therefore
be separately assessed.
A. The Case Against Tax Havens
There are good reasons for regarding tax havens as objectionable. In
particular, they are commonly parasitical. They do not seek to attract real
investment.' 45 Rather, they make themselves available as a means by
which people and firms can escape the taxes they might otherwise have
to pay in other countries. Some of them, at least, deliberately set out to
undermine other countries' tax systems and to profit by so doing. More-
over, what havens typically facilitate is not avoidance (clever, but
disclosed, structuring of entities and transactions) but evasion (dishon-
esty or non-disclosure of relevant facts). Further, developed countries'
losses to havens are substantial, the populations of havens are small, and
only a very small part of the revenues lost by developed countries reap-
pear in the revenues of the havens. The OECD seems on solid ground,
therefore, in its assertion that tax havens generally detract from global
welfare. There are, therefore, good reasons for eradicating tax havens.
142. OECD, 2004, supra note 2, at paras. 11-12.
143. Id. at para. 37.
144. See supra notes 28-30.
145. At least, they do not, in their capacity as havens, seek real investment. It is possible
for a jurisdiction to be a tax haven and also to seek real investment, but the two functions are
distinct.
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Even so, not all havens are indefensible. There are perhaps two sorts
of tax havens. Some set out deliberately to function as havens. That is,
they have structured their tax systems (and other aspects of their legal
systems) deliberately to profit by providing foreign individuals and firms
with a means of avoiding taxes in their own countries. There seems to be
no reason for the countries affected to tolerate this if they can stop it by
legitimate means.
It seems possible, however, that not all havens are of this type. For
perhaps some havens function as havens only incidentally. Perhaps, that
is, their tax systems were developed to meet the needs of their own resi-
dents, and it transpired that they incidentally enabled foreigners to avoid
tax. '4 6 For the OECD to dictate policy to such jurisdictions seems harder
to justify than in the case of jurisdictions which set out deliberately to
undermine other countries' tax systems. For why should a country not
structure its tax system however it wishes? If other countries' taxes are
so onerous that their residents are motivated to resort to elaborate off-
shore structures and criminal non-disclosure of income in order to
escape them, it is not self-evident that it is the tax havens' fault (at least
if the haven did not design its tax system with this objective). But to dis-
tinguish between havens on the basis of the intentions of their
legislatures would appear to be problematic.
Of the thirty-five jurisdictions on the OECD's list of havens, it may
be that all are of the former type. That is, it may be that they all designed
their tax systems deliberately to provide a means by which foreign firms
and individuals might avoid taxes in their own countries. 147 This may be
so also, therefore, of the five jurisdictions still on the Organization's list
of "uncooperative" havens. Perhaps, though, the OECD's campaign
against havens can be interpreted as having spared jurisdictions that did
not set out to become havens but became so incidentally. 48 Even if this is
so, however, until all, or nearly all, havens are closed down-including
those, if any, that became havens only incidentally-it is difficult to see
how the OECD's campaign can succeed.
146. In recent years, tax history has been something of a growth industry. See, e.g., JOHN
TILEY, STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF TAX LAW (2004); STEVEN WEISMAN, THE GREAT TAX
WARS (2002); and the Tax History Project, at http://www.taxhistory.org. But much remains to
be done in explaining the history of even the major OECD countries' tax systems; the history
of most other countries' tax systems remains very largely unwritten.
147. Given the state of the literature, it is impossible to determine the extent to which
this statement is valid.
148. Again, given the state of the literature, it is impossible to determine the extent to
which this statement is valid. The difficulty is exacerbated by the fact that most (and perhaps
all) of those jurisdictions which are traditionally not thought of as tax havens can be used as
tax havens in some circumstances. An important example is the United States, in respect of
interest derived by non-residents. See supra note 81.
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More importantly, even though tax havens are harmful, it does not
follow that it is necessarily desirable for the OECD (or any other collec-
tive of countries) to attempt to eradicate them. The reason is that the cure
may be worse than the ailment. That is, if the matters on which a small
group of rich countries can dictate policy to the rest of the world are ex-
tended to taxation, this seems to represent a further erosion of national
independence and diversity.
Another charge routinely made against tax havens is that they facili-
tate the money-laundering activities of drug dealers, gun runners,
terrorists, and so on. A number of havens appear, indeed, to be guilty.
49
Conduct of this kind seems a more compelling reason for countries af-
fected to violate the sovereignty of the haven facilitating it. It does not
follow, though, that the havens should reform their tax systems. If the
problem is money-laundering, taxing it is not the point. Indeed, for a
government to tax money-laundering (and thus to participate in illicit
gains) would be objectionable.
It is worth noting also that, although some of the tax havens identi-
fied by the OECD are rich (for example, Monaco and the Channel
Islands), many are very poor (for example, the Cook Islands and Libe-
ria). The carrying out of the OECD program seems likely to entail the
intensification of poverty in places already poor. Perhaps it already has.
Those who use tax havens seem unlikely to suffer from the OECD's
campaign, at least in the medium-term-for the closing down of their
haven of choice will mean only that they use another. The volume of
transactions channeled through tax havens seems unlikely to be much
reduced, therefore, until all, or almost all, the havens cease to function as
such. One of the defining characteristics of such transactions is, after all,
that they have no necessary connection with the haven through which
they are channeled. It seems likely that the lawyers, accountants, and
other tax professionals who practice in tax havens (and of whom many
are already expatriate) will prove similarly mobile. That is, they are
likely to move on to the new haven of choice, taking their clients' busi-
ness with them, and carry on more or less as before. As a result, the new
haven will be bigger, richer, more sophisticated, and better able to resist
the efforts of the OECD. It seems likely, though, that those who remain
behind in the ex-haven might suffer more enduring losses. In other
words, it seems likely that, to some extent, the wealth accruing to those
providing professional services in tax havens trickles down to the havens'
149. See Benjamin R. Hartman, Coercing Cooperation from Offshore Financial Centers:
Identity and Coincidence of International Obligations Against Money Laundering and Harm-
ful Tax Competition, 24 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 253, 254-55 (2001); Peter J. Kacarab, An
Indepth Analysis Of The New Money Laundering Statutes, 8 AKRON TAX J. 1, 33 (1991).
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other residents and that the cessation of these services would consequently
impair welfare in these societies generally.
The Committee recognized that for a tax haven to cease operating as
such would cause its economy to contract; that in some cases this would
mean that very low per capita incomes would be lower still; and that aid
of some kind would be needed. 50 Curiously, however, the Committee
assumed also that such an economic contraction would occur only in
some havens, not all (though it did not say which) and that even in these
it would be merely temporary,' but it did not explain why. The Commit-
tee indicated also that, in its view, it would only be cooperative tax
havens which deserved aid."2
B. The Case Against Preferential Tax Regimes
As I have explained, the aim of the OECD's campaign against pref-
erential tax regimes is to protect the economies of the G7 countries and
of its other like-minded Member States and, more particularly, to pre-
serve their tax revenues. This raises an awkward question: why should
other countries, particularly developing countries, go along with it? The
reason preferential tax regimes exist is presumably that the countries that
operate them calculate that it is in their interest to do so. Specifically,
they calculate that their preferential regimes promote economic growth.
To scrap the regimes would, therefore, according to these countries' own
calculations, impair growth. Why, then, should these countries sacrifice
their own economies for the sake of enabling relatively rich countries to
protect their economies and maintain their relatively generous public
spending?
The OECD maintains that harmful tax competition (that is, havens
and harmful preferential regimes) is causing, or is about to cause, a
"world-wide reduction in welfare"'53 and that eliminating these phenom-
ena would raise global welfare. Thus, whilst it seems plain from the
OECD's reports that its principal concern is the protection of its Member
States' own economies and public revenues, the Organization has, not
surprisingly, sought to portray the project as being of more general bene-
fit.
But demonstrating that preferential regimes have caused, or might
cause, a reduction in "global welfare ' '5 4 would appear to present meth-
odological difficulties so grave as to be for practical purposes (and
150. OECD, 2000, supra note 2, at paras. 26-27.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. OECD 1998, supra note 2, at para. 37; see also id. at para. 4.
154. OECD, 2000, supra note 2, at para. 4.
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perhaps for theoretical purposes also) insoluble. The first of these is that
it would appear to require the measurement of "global welfare." Even if
welfare meant simply some function of income and wealth, the difficulty
would be serious. But welfare is presumably not simply a matter of aggre-
gate wealth and income. An increase, no matter how large, in the world's
wealth would presumably have only a very small effect on its welfare if it
all went to a single person. Welfare, then, is presumably a function not
only of wealth and income but of distribution too (and perhaps of other
factors also). But what is the relationship between distribution and wel-
fare? This seems to be very largely a matter of opinion.
Secondly, there is the problem of demonstrating causation. Even if
global welfare could be defined and changes in it measured, on what
basis could they be attributed to preferential regimes rather than other
factors? The need to demonstrate consequences in advance would seem
to make the proof of the hypothesis more difficult still.
Governments, of course, formulate and implement policies all the
time without being in a position to answer questions of this nature. So,
too, do multilateral organizations. But this is one of the reasons democ-
ratic procedures are an ultimate value. If it is impossible to demonstrate
with reasonable confidence the likely consequences of a proposed policy,
it is important that the procedure by which the policy is determined
should allow a suitable voice to all those likely to be affected. The
OECD's tax project seems not to satisfy this criterion.
In any event, as to precisely how developing countries' preferential
regimes might cause a reduction in global welfare, the OECD's analysis
is vague. According to the 1998 Report, preferential regimes might cause
the following harmful effects: 55
1. they might "erode the tax bases of other countries;'
5 6
2. they might "distort trade and investment patterns;"'57
3. they might "alter the structure of taxation (by shifting part of
the tax burden from mobile to relatively immobile factors and
from income to consumption);"'58
155. In explaining the mechanisms by which harmful tax competition reduces global
welfare, the Committee has not systematically distinguished between the effects of havens and
the effects of preferential regimes. Rather, it has lumped them together as harmful tax compe-
tition and attributed to them the consequences listed here. That the Committee has not
assessed separately the effects of havens and of preferential regimes is a good measure of both
the inadequacy of its analysis and the extent to which it has sacrificed analysis to rhetoric (for
the idea seems to have been to tar preferential regimes with the same brush as havens).
156. OECD, 1998, supra note 2, at para. 4.
157. Id.
158. Id. at para. 23.
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4. they might undermine "taxpayer confidence in the integrity of
tax systems; ' 59
5. they might "undermine the fairness, neutrality, and broad so-
cial acceptance of tax systems generally;"'' and
6. they might "hamper the application of progressive tax rates
and the achievement of redistributive goals."'6'
The Committee's key complaint is its first: that preferential regimes
might "erode the tax bases of other countries." Presumably by this it
meant that preferential regimes might erode not only OECD Member
States' tax bases but non-member States' also. Although the Committee
did not elaborate, this complaint seems sound. The aim of a preferential
regime is to attract investment. Such investment might be new (that is, it
might be in addition to all existing investment and so not entail the with-
drawing of some other investment); or it might be merely shifted (for
example, a firm might close or curtail its operations in some other coun-
try so as to invest in the country offering the preferential regime). If the
latter, the tax base of the former country will tend to shrink (or, at least,
grow less speedily than would otherwise be the case). 62
But this core component of the OECD's theory, although sound in it-
self, is insufficient to bear the weight the Organization seeks to place on
it. Granted that preferential regimes are likely to lead to the erosion of
other countries' tax bases. 163 Granted, indeed, that this is in a sense their
principal objective, it does not follow that such regimes are likely to de-
tract from global welfare (however defined).'16 The reason is that the
losses suffered by the countries whose tax bases are eroded might be
offset-or more than offset-by the gains made by the countries operat-
ing the preferential regimes. Indeed, given that the countries making the
complaint are mostly rich (as is evidenced by the fact that they used the
OECD as their vehicle), and given also that the countries using preferen-
tial regimes are mostly poor, the theory that the shifting of investment
resulting from preferential regimes (or from causes including preferen-
tial regimes) is likely to add to global welfare seems entirely plausible.
159. Id. at para. 4.
160. Id.
161. Id. at para. 23.
162. But only if the investor's home country does not operate comprehensive CFC rules.
See supra notes 62-63.
163. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 1, at 1597-99, 1634.
164. Even if global welfare is defined purely in terms of wealth and income (without
reference to distribution or other factors), it does not follow that the erosion of some countries'
tax bases must entail a reduction in it. Nor, therefore, does it follow if a more complex defini-
tion is used.
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Given that the shifting is induced by tax incentives, it may be that the tax
revenues lost by the country losing the investment do not reappear in the
hands of the government of the country gaining the investment. 65 It does
not follow, however, that the country operating the regime cannot gain.
The reason is that the shifted investment, although producing less tax
revenue than in its original country, might nonetheless produce private
benefits for its new host country-in forms such as wages, training, and
technology transfer.' 66 Benefits of these kinds seem in fact to be com-
mon. They also, in some circumstances, generate government
revenues-for example, tax on income from employment.
In any event, the proposition that the erosion of some countries' tax
bases as a result of other countries' preferential tax regimes has led to (or
is likely to lead to) a "world-wide reduction in welfare" (however de-
fined) seems at this point purely speculative. It might be susceptible to
proof, but the OECD has to date not offered any satisfactory evidence.
The proposition consequently remains unproven . It therefore does not
afford a satisfactory basis for action of the kind envisaged by the OECD
(entailing, as it does, the imposition of sanctions by rich countries on
poor ones).
The OECD's second complaint is that preferential tax regimes might
"distort trade and investment patterns."'1' That firms and individuals tend
(all else being equal) to shift their investments from wherever they are to
countries where they would be taxed less heavily or not at all seems un-
contentious. What is not clear, however, is why this should be regarded
as a distortion. The OECD's use of the word seems to imply that the pat-
terns of trade and investment which currently exist in the world are
somehow optimal and that they should therefore be preserved, or, alter-
natively, that the levels of taxation which prevail in the OECD countries
are somehow optimal and that they should therefore be preserved. The
Organization has not explained, however, why this should be so. More-
over, the hypothesis that existing patterns of trade and investment are
165. Even this is not necessarily so. The rate of tax in the country operating the preferen-
tial regime is ex hypothesi lower than the rate in the country from which the investment was
shifted. But the gain made by the country gaining the investment might be greater than the
loss suffered by the country losing it. That is, there might be an increase in overall economic
activity. If so, a lower rate of tax might produce equivalent (or greater) revenues.
166. See Yoram Margalioth, Tax Competition, Foreign Direct Investments and Growth:
Using the Tax System to Promote Developing Countries, 23 VA. TAx REV. 161, 175-80 (2003).
Such spillover benefits might be difficult to quantify. For example, a job regarded as relatively
undesirable and poorly paid in a rich country might be regarded as relatively prestigious and
well paid in a poor country-even if the remuneration is in fact less.
167. Indeed, the OECD, far from demonstrating that preferential regimes have actually
caused the erosion of other countries' tax bases, has not yet produced evidence showing satis-
factorily that this is likely to happen, or even that it is a contributing factor.
168. OECD, 1998, supra note 2, at para. 4.
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likely to maximize global welfare seems inherently implausible. It may
be, on the contrary, that preferential regimes promote the efficient alloca-
tion of resources. 69 The gap between rich countries (most of which are
members of the OECD) and poor countries (most of which operate pref-
erential regimes) seems as wide as ever, and there are far more people in
poor countries than in rich ones. The contrary hypothesis-that shifting
investment from OECD countries to poor countries (whether operating
preferential tax regimes or not) is likely to add to global welfare (how-
ever defined)-therefore seems, again, at least as plausible as that
offered by the OECD. Again, these hypotheses are purely speculative:
the OECD has yet to produce any satisfactory evidence.
Thirdly, the OECD complains that preferential tax regimes might
"alter the structure of taxation (by shifting part of the tax burden from
mobile to relatively immobile factors and from income to consump-
tion). 1 70 In the case of countries operating preferential regimes, this
seems almost axiomatic. Such regimes, by definition, seek to attract for-
eign investment by taxing it less heavily than domestic investment. The
establishment of a preferential regime must therefore tend to shift the
burden of taxation from mobile foreign investment to "relatively immo-
bile factors" (in particular, labor) and from income to consumption. As
for countries which do not operate preferential regimes, they will pre-
sumably tend to lose investment to countries which do. Again this will
tend to shift the burden of taxation to other, less mobile, factors. Perhaps
too, it will tend to shift the burden from income to consumption. Such
countries might respond by establishing preferential regimes of their
own. This too, would tend to result in a shifting of the tax burden from
mobile to relatively immobile factors and from income to consumption.
Again, then, the OECD's complaint seems entirely plausible (though
again, the OECD has offered no satisfactory evidence).
Even if the OECD's hypothesis is sound (that is, even if developing
countries' preferential regimes have caused a shifting of the tax burden
in developed countries), this does not necessarily mean that there will be
a decline in global welfare. The reason, once more, is that the OECD has
offered no reason to suppose that any loss to developed countries will be
greater than the gain to developing countries operating preferential re-
gimes.
The OECD's fourth complaint is that preferential regimes might un-
dermine "taxpayer confidence in the integrity of tax systems." 7' Exactly
169. See Julie Roin, Competition and Evasion: Another Perspective on International Tax
Competition, 89 GEO. L.J. 543, 552-64 (2001); Mitchell B. Weiss, International Tax Competi-
tion: An Efficient or Inefficient Phenomenon?, 16 AKRON TAX J. 99, 118-21, 128-30 (2001).
170. OECD, 1998, supra note 2, at para. 23. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 1.
171. OECD, 1998, supra note 2, at para. 4.
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what it means by this is unclear. In particular, it is unclear whether the
OECD is concerned about taxpayer confidence in the countries operating
the preferential regimes, in the countries whose tax bases are being
eroded, or both. As regards the countries operating the regimes, the
OECD's concern seems misplaced: if these countries choose to operate
such regimes, it is presumably because they have calculated that the
costs (including any undermining of taxpayer confidence) are out-
weighed by the benefits.1 2 Moreover, most of the countries operating
preferential regimes are not members of the OECD. The Organization's
mandate to devise and impose solutions to their problems is, to say the
least, unclear.
As for the countries suffering erosion of their tax bases, the Commit-
tee's complaint seems to have more substance. These countries' citizens
seem clearly displeased at the shifting of investment from their countries
to other countries. It seems reasonable to suppose that their confidence
in the integrity of their countries' tax systems is undermined also. 17 3 In
particular, it seems to be commonly thought that the emigration of capi-
tal is likely to lead to a relative increase in the taxation of labor (as,
indeed, the OECD asserts and that this is undesirable. Once more, this
seems entirely plausible. To characterize it as undermining "taxpayer
172. From the point of view of developing countries, the principal objection to preferen-
tial tax regimes may be that the countries operating them derive no benefit from so doing.
Rather, the benefit goes to the firms which, under the regimes, pay little or no tax. The princi-
pal effect of such regimes is, therefore, according to this line of reasoning, that large firms
operating internationally are able to escape taxes on substantial parts of their profits. This
argument essentially endorses the OECD's position, although its principal concern is not the
erosion of the developed countries' tax revenues but the untaxed exploitation of developing
countries by foreign firms. See ANDREW CHARLTON, INCENTIVE BIDDING FOR MOBILE IN-
VESTMENT: ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES AND POTENTIAL RESPONSES 14 (Research Programme
on Governing Finance and Enterprises: Global, Regional and National, OECD Development
Centre, Working Paper no. 203, 2003), at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/39/63/2492 2 89.pdf.
An alternative argument is that the effect of preferential regimes is to shift tax revenues from
the countries operating the regimes to the countries of residence of the firms taking advantage
of them (because to the extent that a profit is not taxed in the country from which it is derived,
it is more readily available to be taxed in the country in which the firm deriving it resides). See
Kevin Fletcher, Tax Incentives in Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Vietnam 4-16 (Aug. 16-17,
2002), at http://www.imf.orglexternallpubs/ftlseninar/2002/fdi/eng/pdf/fletcher.pdf.
173. Even so, taxpayers' attitudes towards and understanding of their own and other
countries' tax systems seems to be a subject in urgent need of research. Such research could
usefully cover (among other aspects of the subject) taxpayers' beliefs and attitudes as to pref-
erential regimes. The impressionistic evidence is intriguing. Certainly there seems to be
considerable discontent in the developed countries at the emigration of capital and perhaps
also at the consequences for these countries' public finances. On the other hand, one of the
most notable phenomena in countries operating apparently successful preferential tax regimes
(for example, China) is the optimism, indeed ebullience, of the people. Empirical research into
people's attitudes to taxation might also usefully investigate the extent to which people (in
both OECD countries and developing countries) know about and approve of the OECD's pro-
ject on harmful tax competition.
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confidence in the integrity of tax systems" seems reasonable enough.
Again, however, this falls short of demonstrating a decline in global wel-
fare. The reason, again, is simply that the OECD has offered no reason
for supposing that the losses suffered by countries losing investment are
greater than the gains won by countries attracting it.
The OECD's fifth complaint is that preferential tax regimes might
"undermine the fairness, neutrality, and broad social acceptance of tax
systems generally.'' 74 "Fairness," "neutrality," and "broad social accep-
tance" appear to require separate consideration. The neutrality point
seems relatively straightforward. Preferential regimes seem, by defini-
tion, to constitute deliberate departures from neutrality. The hypothesis
that preferential regimes "undermine" neutrality is, therefore, in a sense
true (though the word "undermine" seems inapt in this context). The
OECD's main point is, presumably, that a preferential regime in one
country tends to undermine neutrality in other countries, and perhaps
this is true. Even so, there seems again to be no particular reason to sup-
pose that the developed countries' losses (that is, the losses resulting
from any undermining of their tax systems' neutrality attributable to de-
veloping countries' preferential regimes) are greater than the developing
countries' gains.
As for fairness, it is very largely a matter of opinion. Moreover, fair-
ness is not necessarily an absolute value. In particular, if the peoples of
the less-developed countries regard their own preferential regimes as
unfair (a point upon which evidence is, again, lacking), they might none-
theless regard such unfairness as a price worth paying for the benefits of
attracting investment. The peoples of the developed world might have
other priorities. Again, however, there is no obvious reason to suppose
that any undermining of tax equity in developed countries represents a
loss greater than the gain made by developing countries.
The same analysis applies to "broad social acceptance." Perhaps it is
true that the developing countries' preferential regimes undermine the
broad social acceptance of the developed countries' tax systems (though
the OECD's meaning is, again, far from clear). But this remains un-
proven, and, even if it can be established, the losses suffered by the
developed countries might be outweighed by the gains to the less devel-
oped.
Similarly with the OECD's sixth complaint, that preferential regimes
might "hamper the application of progressive tax rates and the achieve-
ment of redistributive goals."'' 75 It might be true, but it remains unproven,
and once more, even if it is true, there seems to be no reason to suppose,
174. OECD, 1998, supra note 2, at para. 4.
175. Id. at para. 23.
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without satisfactory evidence, that the developed countries' losses (if
any) are greater than the developing countries' gains.
C. A Race to the Bottom?
The OECD's reports say curiously little about the consequences of
preferential tax regimes for the countries that operate them. The Organi-
zation's position seems to be, however, that the countries operating such
regimes are effectively engaged in a "race to the bottom,' 17 6 that they
consequently derive little or no benefit from their regimes, and that they,
in fact, suffer a loss as a result of their regimes.' 7' The theory is that, if a
country seeks to attract foreign investment by offering preferentially
generous tax treatment, some other country might compete for the same
investment by offering even more generous treatment; the first country
might respond by offering treatment more generous still and so on and
so on, until the benefit of attracting the investment has been reduced to
zero. Indeed, the country which succeeds in attracting the investment
might even suffer a loss because it might find itself permitting the for-
eign investor to benefit from its expenditure (on, for example,
infrastructure and education) without charge. If this is so, the preferential
regime, far from generating growth, will function so as merely to permit
the foreign investor to exploit the host country.
This theory, while apparently containing much truth, is not self-
evident. In some cases, it may be that the foreign investor, although
benefiting from a preferential regime (that is, although paying less tax
than would a resident investor), nonetheless still pays sufficient tax to
cover the public spending (and other unpaid-for resources) from which it
benefits. In such a case it is difficult to see how the country operating the
regime has lost as a result. Granted, it has not done as well as it would
have done if the foreign investor had made the investment and paid tax
without the benefit of the preferential regime-but it cannot be assumed
that that alternative is available because, without the preferential regime,
the investment might not have been made.
In other cases, the foreign investor may not pay enough tax to cover
the cost of the public spending from which it benefits. In other words,
the host government has effectively subsidized the foreign investor. This
does not necessarily mean, however, that the country as a whole has suf-
fered a loss as a result of the investment. The reason is that (as
mentioned above) the investment might have produced private benefits
for residents of the host country (in forms such as wages, training, and
176. Id. at para. 43.
177. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 1, at 1647; but see Roin, supra note 169, at 549-50.
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technology transfer), 7 ' and these benefits might exceed the subsidy. For
a government effectively to subsidize private benefits in this way might
raise difficult issues of equity, but these seem to be fully within the prov-
ince of the domestic political processes of the country concerned. The
OECD, in any event, has not claimed a mandate to participate in their
resolution.
D. Preferential Regimes and Global Welfare
All in all, the OECD's theory that eliminating harmful preferential
tax regimes will raise global welfare seems to have been something of an
afterthought. It is supported by only the most skeletal theory and no sat-
isfactory evidence. It is plainly self-serving and, therefore, suspect.
Having decided to eliminate harmful preferential tax regimes, the OECD
needed to persuade the countries operating them to desist. It was thus
necessary to assert that this would be in these countries' own interest.
But the theory that the interests of the world as a whole happen to coin-
cide with those of the G7 seems suspiciously felicitous--especially
given that the countries which operate preferential regimes presumably
calculated that they would gain by doing so.
The OECD's basic complaint is that developing countries' preferen-
tial regimes are harmful to the economies and public revenues of OECD
member countries. If this is true at all, it is presumably equally true of
countries which are not members of the OECD. That is, the OECD's po-
sition is presumably that other countries' preferential regimes are as
harmful to non-members as to members. When it comes to the effect of
preferential regimes on the countries operating them, however, the
OECD's position is vague in the extreme. This lack of clarity seems it-
self a telling measure of the weakness of the Organization's case against
preferential regimes. It seems possible, however, to construct three basic
theories that might serve to justify the OECD's campaign to eradicate
developing countries' harmful preferential tax regimes.'79
The first of these is that all countries operating preferential tax re-
gimes suffer as a result. Given the OECD's premise-that countries that
178. See Margalioth, supra note 166, at 175-80.
179. These three theories are formulated here as if: (1) all developed countries were
members of the OECD; (2) the OECD's membership included no countries other than devel-
oped countries; and (3) all developing countries operate preferential regimes. The first and
second of these three assumptions are in fact false, and it is possible that the third is also.
Nonetheless, to proceed in this manner seems sensible because it is simpler. It is necessary to
emphasize, however, that the cost of this simplicity is that the analysis ignores the position of:(1) developed jurisdictions which are not members of the OECD (for example, Hong Kong
and Singapore); (2) the Organization's less-developed members (for example, Poland and
Mexico); and (3) any less-developed jurisdictions which do not operate preferential regimes.
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do not operate preferential regimes are harmed by countries that do-
this would mean that preferential regimes harm all countries-both those
that operate them and those that do not. If this is so, the consequence of
eradicating such regimes could only be that all countries would gain
(leaving aside the cost of effecting the eradication). 8° The second theory
is that, of the developing countries that operate preferential regimes,
some suffer; some gain; and the net result is negative. Given again the
OECD's premise (that countries that do not operate preferential regimes
are harmed by countries that do), the net result, again, could only be
negative. Again, therefore, the net result of eradicating preferential re-
gimes would be positive (leaving aside, again, the cost of effecting the
eradication). 8' The third theory is that, even if the overall effect of de-
veloping countries' preferential regimes is positive for the countries that
operate them, nonetheless their global impact is negative, because of
their effects on countries that do not. Once more, then, the overall effect
of eradicating preferential regimes would be positive (leaving aside,
once more, the cost of effecting the eradication)."'
The OECD itself seems not to have analyzed in any such terms the
benefits of its campaign to rid the world of "harmful" preferential re-
gimes. Rather, it seems simply to have asserted that eradicating harmful
preferential regimes would somehow raise global welfare-without ex-
plaining how. It seems difficult, though, to justify the OECD campaign
against harmful preferential regimes other than on the basis of some such
theory. But none of these theories, nor any variant of them, seems satis-
factory.
E. The Theory that Everyone Loses
The first theory (that all countries operating preferential regimes suf-
fer as a result) seems most plausibly to be based on the "race to the
bottom" theory. Countries might compete to attract foreign investment
by offering more favorable tax treatment than their neighbors, and so
investment might occur only in countries which offer treatment so favor-
able that they suffer a net loss of welfare as a result. That is, any benefit
180. The principal costs would seem to be the loss of the developing countries' auton-
omy inherent in their taking instructions from the OECD (an organization of which they are
not members), the reduction in the diversity of tax systems operating in the world, the cost of
reforming the developing countries' laws so as to eliminate the preferential regimes, and the
cost of administering the reformed law.
181. In this case, the costs would seem to include the factors identified in note 180 and
also another: compelling countries currently benefiting from their preferential regimes to de-
sist.
182. In this case, the costs would seem to be the same as those identified in note 181,
except that the number of countries bearing them would be larger.
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to the country operating the preferential regime (taxes, if any; employ-
ment; training; transfers of technology and know-how; etc) is less than
the cost (use by the foreign investor of resources provided by the host
country). The host country would therefore, in effect, be subsidizing the
foreign investor.
Once more, the first difficulty with this theory is that it remains un-
proven. Moreover, what evidence there is seems to contradict it, for
some countries operating preferential tax regimes have enjoyed consid-
erable economic success. Perhaps the best current example is China,
which over the last twenty years or so has operated a large number of
preferential regimes, 8 3 attracted an enormous volume of foreign invest-
ment, and experienced spectacular economic growth.'84 The extent to
which, if at all, China's growth is attributable to its preferential tax re-
gimes is, of course, debatable. It is possible that, had China not
established these regimes, its growth would have been even more spec-
tacular (particularly if other countries, too, had refrained or been
prevented from offering tax incentives for foreign investment). But there
seems to be no particular reason to suppose that this is so. On the con-
trary, there seems every reason to suppose that the Chinese government
calculated that tax incentives aimed at attracting foreign investment
would promote economic growth and that its calculations have been
thoroughly vindicated by events. Indeed, it seems possible that it is pre-
cisely because preferential regimes have proved so successful in
countries such as China that the OECD now wishes to shut them down.
A second difficulty is that, even if it is accepted that developing
countries' preferential tax regimes are invariably harmful to the countries
that operate them, it is not self-evident that it is appropriate for the
OECD to attempt, condescendingly, to save them from their own collec-
183. On the structure of China's tax system generally, see MICHAEL J. MOSER &
WINSTON K. ZEE, CHINA TAX GUIDE (3d. ed. 1999) and LANCASTER, supra note 128.
184. According to the World Bank, per capita GDP in China increased from US$173 in
1981 to US$1024 in 2003 (at constant 1995 US$). WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT
INDICATORS ONLINE, at http://devdata.worldbank.org/query. According to the United Nations,
China's per capita GDP rose at a rate of 9.1% per year from 1981 to 1990 and 9.7% per year
from 1991 to 2002. U.N. DEP'T OF ECONOMIC & SOCIAL AFFAIRS, WORLD ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL SURVEY, 2003, at 269, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/283, U.N. Sales No. E.03.IJ.C.1 (2003).
References to data on China's economic growth and the scale of foreign investment in China
are given below at notes 272 and 273. Growth in poor countries will not necessarily alleviate
poverty, because any increase in wealth might be very narrowly distributed. Indeed, an in-
crease in a country's wealth, if narrowly distributed, might be accompanied by an increase in
overall poverty. In fact, growth in less developed countries has commonly been characterized
by extreme inequalities of distribution. Even so, growth seems in many countries to have re-
sulted in a widespread alleviation of poverty. China is, again, a good example. In any event,
there seems no reason to suppose that wealth in poor countries is any less likely to alleviate
poverty than in rich ones.
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tive folly. Rather, it would clearly have been better for the developing
countries to have been involved in the process-and on an equal footing,
not on the receiving end of the OECD's "dialogue."'85 As it happens, the
developing countries themselves seem to have made no effort to elimi-
nate this form of tax competition. If they perceived themselves as
suffering from their own and one another's preferential regimes in a race
to the bottom, one might have expected them to club together to stop this
from happening or at least to make the attempt. That they appear not to
have done so seems powerful evidence that the developing countries do
not perceive this as a race to the bottom and that some of them, at least,
are benefiting from their preferential regimes.86
There is no obvious reason to regard the OECD (which, as it ac-
knowledged from the outset, is principally concerned for its own
Member States' treasuries)'87 as any better placed to calculate the inter-
ests of the developing countries. Moreover, if the OECD had any
evidence that the developing countries were suffering as a result of their
preferential regimes, one might expect it to publish it, but it seems not to
have done so. Presumably, then, the OECD possesses no such evidence.
It is worth noting also in this context that, as is recounted above, the
OECD's view of jurisdictions functioning as havens is that they are
likely to benefit from doing so and so are likely to suffer if they desist.
8
This seems entirely plausible. But if it is true of havens, what reason is
there for supposing that it is not true of countries operating preferential
regimes?
F. The Theory that the Net Result is Negative
The second theory that might provide a justification for the OECD's
project to eliminate harmful preferential tax regimes is that, of the coun-
tries that operate such regimes, some suffer, some gain, and the net result
is negative. But this, too, is unsatisfactory. In particular, again, it remains
unproven. Perhaps, in fact, the net result is not negative-maybe some
countries gain, others lose, and the net result is positive. This is an em-
pirical question, entailing difficult issues of measurement. To date, again,
185. See OECD, 1998, supra note 2, at para. 156.
186. The OECD has suggested also that countries "may find themselves in a 'prisoners
[sic] dilemma' where they collectively would be better off by not offering incentives but each
feels compelled to offer the incentive to maintain a competitive business environment." Id. at
para. 80. In its traditional form, however, the point of the prisoners' dilemma is that the pris-
oners are unable to communicate or to engage in mutually reassuring behaviors. It is not clear
why this should be so of governments, and the OECD does not explain.
187. See id. at para. 1.
188. See OECD, 2000, supra note 2, at paras. 26-27.
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the OECD seems to have presented no evidence satisfactorily supporting
this theory.
Moreover, even if this theory is sound (that the net outcome of pref-
erential regimes in the countries which operate them is negative), it
raises again, in a slightly different form, the question of the appropriate-
ness of OECD intervention. ' It is one thing for the OECD to seek to
dictate tax policy to poor countries, if all involved accept that the poor
countries in question will benefit as a result. But if some developing
countries are gaining as a result of their preferential regimes, it is unclear
why they should cease to operate them (other than that the OECD coun-
tries might punish them if they do not). To treat such regimes like tax
havens seems unfair because their objective is not to undermine other
countries' tax systems but to attract real investment.
G. The Theory that Tax Competition Harms Those
Who Decline to Compete
The third theory which might serve to justify the OECD's campaign
against preferential tax regimes is that, even if the countries that operate
such regimes collectively benefit from doing so, these benefits are out-
weighed by the combined losses suffered by countries that do not. The
first problem with this theory is that, like the others, it remains unproven.
Another, more serious, objection is that this third theory seems re-
ducible to the proposition that the developing countries should sacrifice
their growth (and sacrifice also, therefore, their attempts to alleviate pov-
erty) so that the developed countries can protect their economies and
maintain their relatively high levels of public spending. The assertion
that this might somehow maximize global welfare seems difficult to jus-
tify. This is perhaps why the OECD has not articulated it. Nonetheless,
the hypothesis that this is exactly what the OECD has set out to achieve
seems all too plausible.' 90
H. Selective CFC and FIF Regimes: A Form of
Harmful Tax Competition?
It would appear to be possible for the OECD countries (and other
like-minded countries) to eliminate the effectiveness of other countries'
preferential tax regimes by adopting more comprehensive CFC and FIF
regimes. That is, such countries could extend their CFC and FIF regimes
189. See infra note 279.
190. As Avi-Yonah has observed, the OECD's emphasis on its own Member States'
revenues "is unfortunate, given both the paucity of the evidence and the impression it gives of
government bureaucrats trying to protect their cherished tax revenues; it certainly does noth-
ing to combat the Leviathan critique." Avi-Yonah, supra note 1, at 1658, n. 405.
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so as to cover all income accumulated in offshore entities rather than
only some of such income as is currently provided for by most countries'
CFC and FIF rules.' 9' Technically, this would be simple. Much of the
complexity of most countries' existing CFC regimes is due to the differ-
ential treatment of CFCs. CFCs in some foreign countries are treated
differently from CFCs in other foreign countries; CFCs which are ac-
tively engaged in business are treated differently from those which are
not and so on. If the developed countries were to eliminate such differen-
tials, the consequences would seem to include the elimination of the
192
effectiveness of other countries' preferential tax regimes. It would en-
tail other advantages also. In particular, it would be more equitable,' 93
and it would make it possible for the law to be significantly simpler.
The reason the OECD countries have mostly not taken this simple
step seems to be that they are competing with one another. For a country
(say, the United States) to eliminate this kind of avoidance would be
technically straightforward. 94 It would mean, though, that U.S. firms
would be at a disadvantage, as against firms resident in other countries,
in offshore investment. Assume, for example, that China operates a pref-
erential tax regime under which corporations owned by non-residents
and engaged in manufacturing in China are exempt from Chinese tax for
ten years; assume also that a U.S. firm and a British firm are both con-
sidering establishing manufacturing subsidiaries in China so as to benefit
under this regime, and assume lastly that these two firms compete in the
same markets. If the British CFC rules do not tax the British firm on the
undistributed profits of its Chinese subsidiary, the British firm will be
able to defer its liability to British tax by accumulating profit in its sub-
sidiary. If the U.S. CFC rules operate in the same manner, the U.S. firm
and the British firm will compete on an equal footing; both will be able
to defer home-country tax on the undistributed profits of their Chinese
191. See supra notes 62-63.
192. Most countries' CFC rules are not comprehensive. For example, they commonly do
not apply to CFCs actively engaged in business. Consequently, a firm can commonly avoid tax
by operating its active offshore business through a CFC and accumulating the profit in the
CFC. Such profit will typically be taxed if distributed to the parent company in the form of a
dividend, but if it is not distributed, it is commonly not taxable to the parent. See sources cited
in supra note 62. An example of a country operating comprehensive CFC and FIF regimes is
New Zealand. For a brief account of New Zealand's CFC regime, see Rohatgi, supra note 62,
at 386-87.
193. Such action would be more equitable in that it would result in equal tax treatment
for domestic and offshore investment in the firm's home jurisdiction.
194. Avoidance of this kind is sometimes referred to as deferral because the parent com-
pany's tax liability in its home jurisdiction is deferred until the foreign subsidiary distributes
its profit in the form of a dividend. But if the subsidiary never pays a dividend, the parent
never becomes liable for tax.
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subsidiaries. 95 But if the United States were to extend its CFC rules so as
to cover the undistributed profits of the U.S. firm's Chinese subsidiary
(while Britain left its CFC regime unchanged), this equality would be
lost: the profits of the U.S. firm's subsidiary would be chargeable to U.S.
tax (whether distributed to the parent or not), but the profits of the Brit-
ish firm's subsidiary would not be chargeable to British tax (unless
distributed to the parent). The U.S. firm would consequently find itself at
a competitive disadvantage as against the British firm.
Thus, it is not only the countries which operate preferential regimes
which can be seen as engaged in a race to the bottom. So, too, can the
countries operating leaky CFC regimes. One solution to this problem (if
it is a problem) would be for the countries operating preferential regimes
to desist. Another would be for the countries operating leaky CFC re-
gimes to eliminate the leaks. That is, the United States, the United
Kingdom, and the other capital-exporting countries could extend their
CFC rules so as to cover all income accumulated in their residents'
CFCs. Both solutions appear to require coordinated action. In order to
solve the problem by eliminating preferential regimes, it would be nec-
essary to eliminate all of them (or, at least, nearly all of them) and to do
so more or less simultaneously; otherwise the tardy would gain. Simi-
larly, in order to solve the problem by plugging the gaps in the capital-
exporting countries' CFC regimes, it would be necessary to eliminate all
of the gaps (or, again, nearly all of them) and to do so more or less si-
multaneously; otherwise, again, the tardy would gain.
It might be feasible, in the short term, for the OECD and its Member
States to implement the latter solution on their own, without involving
non-member States at all. The reason is that the overwhelming majority
of multinational enterprises (MNEs), accounting for an even more over-
whelming proportion of their combined capital, are resident in OECD
• 196
countries. It would be more satisfactory to arrange for the participation
of all of the countries in which MNEs are resident, but the OECD Mem-
ber States (and other like-minded non-members) might suffice.
In the longer term, the adoption of comprehensive CFC regimes by
all the OECD countries might prove an inadequate solution. The adop-
tion of comprehensive CFC rules by a country might bring it to tax its
resident MNEs' CFC income in the short-term, but in the long-term, it
might induce MNEs to emigrate. That is, MNEs might shift their resi-
dence from countries that operate comprehensive CFC regimes to
195. Both will, therefore, have an advantage over those of their competitors who conduct
their manufacturing in the United States or the United Kingdom.
196. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 1, at 1665.
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countries that do not.'97 Assuming, then, all OECD countries to have
adopted comprehensive CFC regimes, MNEs might shift to non-OECD
countries. The consequence would be that the OECD country in which a
MNE had previously been resident would generally lose the tax revenues
it had previously derived from that MNE, except to the extent derived
from income either attributable to a permanent establishment within the
country or derived from within the country.
Once more, it is not self-evident that global welfare would suffer as
a result of such corporate emigration, for perhaps the loss suffered by the
OECD country would be offset, or more than offset, by the gain enjoyed
by the non-OECD country to which the MNE had emigrated. In any
event, to the extent that the MNE's shareholders were resident in the
OECD country in question, it would appear to be relatively straightfor-
ward for that country to recover its lost tax revenues. If it already had in
place a comprehensive FIF regime, 98 nothing would be required; the
shareholders would be taxable on the MNE's profits (whether distributed
or not) and on the profits of its subsidiaries. If it did not have such a re-
gime, all it would need to do would be to establish one.
It is possible that natural persons holding the ultimate beneficial
ownership of the MNE might emigrate too. To this, there seems to be no
solution. But, if an OECD country finds its citizenry emigrating to non-
OECD countries in order to escape its taxes, perhaps the remedy lies in
reducing the burden.
In summary, it is the OECD countries which regard the current state
of affairs as problematic, and it is within their power to fix it (by adopt-
ing comprehensive CFC and FIF rules) without involving non-OECD
countries. As outlined in its reports, however, the OECD's preference is
for the burden of fixing the problem to be borne by the developing coun-
tries--even though they do not see it as a problem. The OECD seems not
to have explained, however, why it prefers this solution (that is, for the
developing countries to abolish their preferential regimes) to the other
(that is, for the developed countries to extend their CFC and FIF re-
gimes).1
197. See, e.g., Robert T Kudrle & Lorraine Eden, The Campaign Against Tax Havens:
Will it Last? Will it Work?, 9 STAN. J. L., Bus. & FIN. 37, 58-60 (2003). See also Avi-Yonah,
supra note 1, at 1665-66.
198. See supra note 63.
199. One possible explanation is the disproportionate influence of those OECD residents
who enjoy significant and currently under-taxed offshore income, and who are therefore op-
posed to any extension of their home-countries' CFC and FIF rules (which could effectively
tax their currently under-taxed offshore income).
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IV. PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF THE OECD PROJECT
The OECD's campaign to eradicate tax havens and harmful prefer-
ential tax regimes seems flawed, not only in principle, but in several
important practical respects also. In particular, the Organization has car-
ried out its project in an opaque and secretive manner. Moreover, the two
basic categories upon which it has based its project seem inadequately
defined. That is, the OECD has not adequately explained what it means
by "tax haven" or by "harmful preferential tax regime." These procedural
deficiencies have led to results which seem unsatisfactory. In particular,
a number of jurisdictions which seem plainly to be tax havens have es-
caped the OECD's attentions. As to why some jurisdictions have been
classified as havens and others have not, the OECD has not explained.
The Organization has, thus, made important decisions about a large
number of non-member States on the basis of ill-defined rules and with-
out giving reasons. It seems, consequently, to have left itself open to the
charge of having made these decisions on the basis of undisclosed politi-
cal or other considerations.
The total population of the jurisdictions which might be classified as
tax havens seems to be only a few million people. 2°° Perhaps, then, the
OECD calculated that this was a de minimis problem and that it was
therefore unproblematic to sacrifice the livelihoods of these people for
the greater good. The Organization has also, as I have mentioned, pro-
posed providing transitional aid to cooperative havens, and their
populations might be small enough for such aid to be meaningful. The
countries which might be classified (according to the OECD's rather
amorphous criteria) as operating harmful preferential regimes, however,
seem to account for a sizable majority, perhaps an overwhelming major-
ity, of the world's total population. To make decisions intended to affect
the structures of these countries' economies on the basis of ill-defined
rules and without giving reasons would appear to require some justifica-
tion. The OECD has not proposed providing aid to less-developed
countries which cooperate in eliminating their harmful preferential re-
gimes, but, even if it were to do so, the number of persons likely to be
affected is so immense that it seems unlikely that any such aid would be
meaningful.
A. Opacity
The OECD's project has to date been unsatisfactorily opaque in a
number of respects. First, the OECD appears at no point to have at-
200. This is excluding production havens (see Avi-Yonah supra note 1, at 1584 n.26,
1588-89), which the OECD seems to count as preferential regimes rather than as havens.
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tempted to determine whether tax competition is, in fact, harmful.
Rather, its Member States seem simply to have instructed the Organiza-
tion that this is the case and required it to devise a solution. Presumably
the Member States based their position on evidence of some kind, but
this seems not to have been disclosed. The OECD appears to have acted,
in accordance with its instructions, on the premise that tax competition is
harmful (in some circumstances, at least). It seems, however, to have
gone further in that it has asserted that tax competition is not only harm-
ful to the tax bases of its Member States but also detracts from "global
welfare."' '2 But the Organization seems not to have disclosed the basis
for this assertion. Perhaps the Organization's members instructed it to
proceed on this basis; perhaps they provided some empirical support, or
perhaps the proposition is based on nothing more than the OECD's own
speculations.
Moreover, the OECD has not disclosed how it came to conclude that
there are two, and only two, forms of tax competition requiring reme-
dies, namely tax havens and harmful preferential tax regimes. In
particular, the OECD has not explained why it does not regard developed
countries' leaky CFC and FIF regimes as harmfully competitive. Per-
haps, again, the Organization was merely carrying out instructions
received from its members. Or perhaps it formulated this theory itself. In
any event, it is unclear whether the theory is based on evidence of some
kind or is purely speculative.
The manner in which the OECD went about identifying havens was
similarly opaque. It started by drawing up a list of forty-seven jurisdic-
tions which it thought might be havens. It did not, however, publish this
list. It then removed six jurisdictions from the list on the basis that it had
determined, on closer inspection, that they were not havens after all. The
OECD seems, however, not to have disclosed the identities of these six
jurisdictions. Nor has it explained the basis upon which it initially de-
termined that they were havens. Moreover, the number of marginal cases
would appear to be greater than six. That is, there are jurisdictions that
should probably be counted as havens but that were not even on the
original list of forty-seven. The OECD's criteria for identifying havens
are vague and ambiguous. Moreover, the OECD has revealed almost
nothing as to how it went about weighing each criterion against the oth-
ers.
The opacity of the OECD's procedures is ironic given that one of the
Organization's main requirements of havens (and, presumably, of coun-
tries operating preferential regimes, though this remains to be seen) is
transparency.
201. OECD, 1998, supra note 2, at para. 4.
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B. What is a Tax Haven?
In order to eradicate tax havens, it is necessary to determine with de-
fensible precision what the term means. This, however, is not as
straightforward as it might seem. The term "tax haven" is commonly
used to denote a jurisdiction which imposes either no income taxes at all
or only nominal income taxes. Some jurisdictions, however, tax some
forms of income (at higher than nominal rates) and exempt others and, in
fact, function as havens. That is, individuals and firms routinely conduct
transactions through such jurisdictions for no other purpose than to es-
cape taxes which they would otherwise be obliged to pay in other
jurisdictions.
This basic ambiguity in common usage has found its way into the
OECD's analysis, with unsatisfactory results. That is, it is unclear
whether, according to the OECD, a tax haven is simply a jurisdiction
which imposes no income taxes (or only nominal income taxes) or
whether a jurisdiction might count as a tax haven if it imposes tax at
higher-than-nominal rates on some forms of income but no tax at all (or
only nominal tax) on other forms of income. The former definition is
unsatisfactory, for it permits havens of the latter kind to escape. The mer-
its of the OECD's campaign against havens are debatable but to wage a
campaign against jurisdictions coming within the narrower definition of
haven (no or only nominal taxes) but not against jurisdictions only com-
ing within the broader definition (higher than nominal taxes, some
categories of income exempt, in fact functioning as havens) seems prob-
lematic because: it would seem not to solve the problem with which the
OECD is concerned (erosion of the Member States' tax bases); it seems
unfair to impose sanctions on some havens and not others; and this ap-
parent unfairness might make it politically difficult to impose sanctions
on some havens and not others. But the latter definition seems problem-
atic also because it blurs the distinction between havens and preferential
regimes, and it appears to cover a very large number of countries (for
example, the United States, in respect of the non-taxation of interest de-
rived by non-residents) which seem unlikely to restructure their tax
203
systems .
202. In its 1998 Report, the Committee said that havens are jurisdictions which "are able
to finance their public services with no or nominal income taxes." Id. at paras. 42-44. This
Report also, however, contained this statement "No or only nominal taxation on the relevant
income is the starting point to classify a jurisdiction as a tax haven." Id. at Box I (emphasis
added). But it did not explain what was meant by "relevant." The thirty-five havens identified
by the OECD in 2000 seem generally to come within the narrow definition of haven.
203. Indeed, most countries, and possibly all, are used as tax havens. That is, with re-
spect to every country, it is likely that transactions are channeled through it so as to produce a
tax advantage in some other country.
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Worse, if such a jurisdiction is not a haven, it is not even clear that
its exemption of some forms of income would count as a preferential
regime because such an exemption might not satisfy the other criteria for
preferential regimes. In particular, it might not be ring-fenced. That is, it
might be available not only to non-residents but to residents also, and it
might be subject to no restrictions as to operating in the domestic mar-
ket. If a jurisdiction operating such an exemption could count (under the
OECD's criteria) as neither a haven nor a preferential regime, that would
seem to leave a substantial gap in the Organization's scheme. This basic
uncertainty seems to have allowed a number of important havens to es-
cape the Organization's attentions. Examples include Switzerland2°4 and
Luxembourg (both of which are members of the OECD, and both of
which, as I have recounted, declined to endorse the Committee's report)
and Hong Kong.
Hong Kong serves as a convenient example.25 The OECD has not
explained why it did not include Hong Kong on its list of havens (let
alone on its list of uncooperative havens). The reason is presumably that
Hong Kong imposes significant taxes on income. The maximum per-
sonal rate of tax is currently 16%.2° The corporate rate is 17.5%.207 The
territory's rules on matters such as deductibility, depreciation, perks, and
transfer pricing, however, are very generous compared to those to be
found in OECD countries.208 The ways in which these rules are inter-
preted and administered are likewise relatively generous. 209 Perhaps,
then, when the OECD comes to look at Hong Kong, it will conclude that
the "effective '' 21° rate of tax is generally less than the formal rate of
17.5% and perhaps much less. By OECD standards, then, Hong Kong's
rate of tax is low; apparently, though, it is not low enough to make Hong
Kong a haven.
204. Described in one analysis as "the uber-haven." Kudrle & Eden, supra note 197, at
42.
205. Hong Kong's system of income taxation is provided for (still) by the H.K. Inland
Revenue Ordinance Ch. 112 (2003), at http://www.ird.gov.hk/eng/abo/ord.htm. Pieces of pri-
mary legislation in colonial Hong Kong were called ordinances, not acts. This appears to have
been the custom in British colonies not possessing responsible government. The practice has
survived the return of the territory to Chinese rle in 1997. The best general commentary on
the Ordinance and the cases bearing on its interpretation is PETER WILLOUGHBY & ANDREW
HALKYARD, ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF HONG KONG TAXATION (1993).
206. In some circumstances, there is a marginal rate of 20%, but total liability is capped
at 16%. Very few people are actually taxed at this rate; most pay significantly less. The allow-
ances are so generous that about two-thirds of the workforce pay no tax on their incomes at
all. See Inland Revenue Ordinance §§ 13, 43, schedule 2.
207. Id. § 14, schedule 8.
208. See generally WILLOUGHBY & HALKYARD, supra note 205.
209. See generally id.
210. See OECD, 1998, supra note 2, at para. 61.
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But Hong Kong is, in fact, obviously a tax haven: very large sums of
money pass through it for no other reason than that they would otherwise
be taxed (or taxed more heavily) elsewhere.2 ' The main reason it is pos-
sible to use Hong Kong as a haven is that, although it taxes some classes
112 211of income (in particular, profits, rents,"' and salaries214 but in each case
only if derived from Hong Kong) at higher than nominal rates, others are
not taxed at all. In particular, the following categories of income are
commonly or invariably not taxed in Hong Kong: interest, dividends, and
offshore income of all kinds.21 5 This does not depend on residence; nei-
ther residents of Hong Kong nor non-residents are taxed on income of
these kinds. The scope for persons resident in other countries to use
Hong Kong as a tax haven is consequently enormous.1 6 Indeed, the fact
that Hong Kong is not merely a haven tends to make it a more attractive
one. The reason is that, although a very large number of transactions go
211. As I have mentioned (supra note 203), most countries and perhaps all function as
havens to some extent. The question seems, therefore, to be one of degree. Hong Kong is sin-
gled out here not because it is a haven (for that is likely true of all countries), but because it is
a particularly instructive case. It is important to emphasize also that, although Hong Kong
functions as a tax haven (that is, foreigners are able to use it to escape taxes in their home
jurisdictions), the territory's government did not design its tax system with that objective in
mind. That is, it did not set out deliberately to undermine other countries' tax systems. On the
history of Hong Kong's tax system, see Michael Littlewood, Taxation Without Representation:
The History of Hong Kong's Troublingly Successful Tax System, 2002 BRIT. TAX REv. 212
(2002). Moreover, Hong Kong is not merely a tax haven. It is a complex, affluent, modern
society. The populace numbers seven million. The government, although not democratic, is
mindful of pubic opinion. It finances a range of public services including a large public hous-
ing program, a comprehensive public health service, and an expensive public education
system. In some respects, Hong Kong's public services are not up to the standard of those to
be found in comparably affluent western societies. For example, Hong Kong's public housing
is cramped and uncongenial by western standards. In others, they are better. Examples include
the public transport system and the financing of the territory's eight universities. Hong Kong
cannot, therefore, be written off as merely a haven. On Hong Kong's system of government
generally, see NORMAN MINERS, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF HONG KONG (1998).
212. Inland Revenue Ordinance § 14.
213. Inland Revenue Ordinance § 5.
214. Inland Revenue Ordinance § 8.
215. Interest is taxed if produced by the carrying on of a business (for example, banking
or selling goods on credit), but interest is generally otherwise not taxable. Dividends are not
taxable in any circumstances. Offshore income is taxable in very limited circumstances-for
example, profits derived from outside Hong Kong by a bank carrying on business in Hong
Kong are taxable (but not if attributable to a permanent establishment outside Hong Kong). If
a firm carries on business in Hong Kong, its actively-produced profits are generally treated as
derived from Hong Kong (and therefore taxable), but not if they are attributable to an offshore
permanent (or, perhaps, temporary) establishment (in which case, they are not taxable); pas-
sive income is routinely accepted as being derived from outside Hong Kong (and therefore not
taxable). Also, there is no tax on capital gains in Hong Kong. See generally WILLOUGHBY &
HALKYARD, supra note 205.
216. Persons resident in Hong Kong are likewise commonly able to escape tax on in-
come derived from other countries,see generally WILLOUGHBY & HALKYARD, supra note 205,
but the OECD presumably regards this as a minor aspect of the problem.
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through Hong Kong entirely for tax reasons, an even larger number go
through it for genuine commercial reasons. If a resident of an OECD
country derives income from, or makes a payment to, an entity in, say,
Vanuatu or the British Virgin Islands, the OECD country's tax authority
will tend to suspect, with good reason, that the transaction is driven by
an intention to avoid tax. But, if the entity is situated in Hong Kong, the
OECD country's tax authority will be less sure-for a transaction
through Hong Kong might be tax-driven but is very likely also not.
Perhaps the OECD's unstated strategy is to deal with the easy targets
first (for example, Vanuatu) then move on to the harder (for example,
Hong Kong) and so by degrees eliminate the use of tax havens. But this
process might be more difficult than it seems. One reason for this is that
eliminating one or two or even thirty-five tax havens is unlikely to elimi-
nate the transactions that would otherwise have been channeled through
them. Rather, the parties to the transactions will simply tend to use some
other tax haven. Thus, so long as any tax havens exist, the problem will
remain largely unresolved. Moreover, in the meantime, the surviving
havens will win the business that would have gone through those havens
that have been shut down. Thus, the OECD's project seems likely merely
to shift tax-driven transactions from the targeted tax havens to those as
yet untargeted.
Perhaps, too, the OECD's intention is to accept that jurisdictions
such as Hong Kong are not havens and to attack their capacity to func-
tion as havens by classifying them instead as harmful preferential tax
regimes. But this is less than satisfactory because the matter is not
merely one of semantics. The OECD's ostensible plan was to identify
havens as such and stigmatize them as such. To spare some havens, on
purely semantic grounds, would seem unfair. Moreover, the OECD's
progress against preferential regimes has been much slower than its pro-
gress against havens. To treat some havens as preferential regimes thus
seems unduly lenient. More seriously, it appears possible that the OECD
will treat Hong Kong neither as a haven nor as a preferential regime and
that the territory might consequently escape the Organization's attentions
altogether. As already explained, the OECD seems not to regard Hong
Kong as a haven. But it seems possible that Hong Kong's non-taxation of
some classes of income (offshore income, dividends, and so on)217 might
not satisfy the OECD's criteria for being a preferential regime either.
A further problem is that the OECD's campaign against tax havens
has produced outcomes which seem to be not only technically flawed but
politically unfortunate. In particular, the smaller, weaker havens all seem
to have been classified as such; whereas the havens that have escaped (to
217. See generally id.
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date, at least) include some that are larger, richer, and better-connected.
The Cook Islands and Vanuatu, for example, are very small and very
poor. They appeared on the OECD's list of havens. Switzerland and
Hong Kong, in contrast, are relatively large and relatively rich. More-
over, Switzerland is a member of the OECD. It would therefore seem to
have been able to veto the OECD's original 1998 Report (rather than
merely abstaining). This might not have been fatal to the project, but it
would have been embarrassing for the Organization and its other mem-
bers and would probably have led to delay. As for Hong Kong, it is part
of China, and the OECD, whilst having few qualms about dictating tax
policy to, say, Vanuatu (and damaging its small and inconsequential
economy), might have hesitated to do the same to China (especially
given the scale of OECD-resident firms' operations both in Hong Kong
and in other parts of China).
C. What is a Harmful Preferential Tax Regime?
Similarly, in order to eradicate harmful preferential tax regimes, it is
necessary to determine what these words mean. That is, it is necessary,
first, to determine what counts as a preferential tax regime and, second,
to determine how harmful regimes are to be distinguished from harm-
less.218
The OECD's answer to the first question seems to be that a preferen-
tial regime is one which exempts a specified class or classes of income
from tax in a jurisdiction which taxes income generally. Even this, how-
ever, is not as straightforward as it might seem. Again, Hong Kong
illustrates the problem. As I have explained, important categories of in-
come are not taxed in Hong Kong at all. These include offshore income
of all kinds, dividends, and interest .2 9 But whether the non-taxability of
income of these kinds can properly be described as a "preferential tax
regime" (or a series of regimes) is unclear. The term "preferential tax
regime" connotes a set of rules providing for preferential treatment of
some kind. The implication is that there is a general rule imposing tax, to
which the preferential regime provides some sort of exception. This,
however, is not an apt description of Hong Kong's non-taxation of off-
shore income, dividends, or interest-for there is no general rule
imposing tax on offshore income, dividends, or interest nor, therefore,
any exemption of income of these kinds. There is, indeed, no tax at all
on income as such. Rather, there is a schedular system of three separate
taxes on three different kinds of income: property tax is charged on
218. See OECD, 1998, supra note 3, at para. 4.
219. See generally WILLOUGHBY & HALKYARD, supra note 205.
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rents; 221 salaries tax is charged on income from employment; 22' and prof-
its tax is charged on profits 2 Income of other kinds (such as, notably,
dividends and interest) is, therefore, simply not taxable.2 3 To classify
these limitations as "preferential regimes" seems an unnatural use of the
term. Moreover, each of the three taxes is imposed only on income "de-
rived from Hong Kong., 224 Income derived from outside Hong Kong is,
therefore, simply not taxable. 25 Again, to classify this as a "regime"
seems odd.
The OECD's approach to the distinction between harmful and harm-
less preferential regimes seems even more problematic. The distinction
seems to be crucial, for harmful regimes are to be eradicated and harm-
less ones left alone. Getting rid of all preferential regimes would have
been very much simpler (though perhaps politically more difficult). As I
have recounted, the OECD has already found that some of its own Mem-
ber States' preferential regimes are harmless. 26 Presumably it will in due
course conclude that some non-OECD countries' preferential regimes
are harmless also. At the same time, though, the Organization has been
very coy about conceding that this is so. It acknowledged, for example,
that, "at certain stages '227 of development, tax incentives might be "justi-
fiable from the point of view of the country in question" 228-but this is
hardly an enthusiastic endorsement. Moreover, the OECD seems to re-
gard any shifting of investment as suspect. It alludes to countries
"bidding aggressively" 229 for other countries' tax bases and of countries
"poaching"23 a tax base that "rightly belongs' 23' to another country and
concludes that "such practices would be doubtlessly labeled 'harmful tax
competition' .,,232 But none of these terms-"bidding aggressively,"
"poaching," "rightly belongs"-is defined.
220. Inland Revenue Ordinance § 5.
221. Inland Revenue Ordinance § 8.
222. Inland Revenue Ordinance § 14.
223. See WILLOUGHBY & HALKYARD, supra note 205.
224. To be precise, salaries tax and profits tax are charged on (and only on) income of
the relevant kinds "arising in or derived from Hong Kong" (see Inland Revenue Ordinance
§§ 8 and 14 respectively), and property tax is charged on rents derived from property (that is,
land and buildings) "situate in Hong Kong" (see Inland Revenue Ordinance § 5). See also
WILLOUGHBY & HALKYARD, supra note 205.
225. See WILLOUGHBY & HALKYARD, supra note 205.
226. OECD, 2004, supra note 2, at paras. 11-12.
227. OECD, 1998, supra note 2, at para. 27.
228. Id.
229. Id. at para. 29.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at paras. 29-31. The OECD itself put the words "poaching" and "rightly" in
quotation marks-but what this signifies is not clear.
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As is outlined above, the OECD proposed to determine whether a
preferential regime is "harmful" or not by reference to four key, factors,
eight other factors, and three questions as to the regime's "economic ef-
fects." But the Organization has proposed only the vaguest of methods
for weighing this complex of factors. That the relevant income is subject
to no taxation at all or to a low rate of tax is a threshold requirement
(though neither "relevant" nor "low" is defined). Presumably greater
weight is to be attached to the "key" factors than to the "other" factors or
to the answers to the three questions. Beyond this, however, nothing sys-
tematic is indicated. Rather, the intention seems to be that all the factors
specified as relevant are to be thrown together, and somehow the answer
will emerge. Depending on the weight given to the various factors, any
preferential regime could probably be counted as either harmful or harm-
less. Once more, then, this hardly amounts to a rule. At best, the results
will be arbitrary and, at worst, dependent on undisclosed and ostensibly
irrelevant political or other considerations.233
Once more, Hong Kong provides an instructive example. If the terri-
tory's non-taxation of offshore income, dividends, and interest constitute
preferential regimes, these regimes would seem to pass the threshold test
of imposing low or no tax on the relevant income (depending, perhaps,
on what is meant by "relevant"). As for the other three key factors (ring-
fencing, transparency, and information exchange), Hong Kong's prefer-
ential regimes seem, on balance, not to be harmful. In particular, its
preferential regimes (assuming its non-taxation of offshore income, divi-
dends, and interest qualify as such) are not "ring-fenced." Rather,
income of these kinds is generally not taxed in Hong Kong irrespective
of whether the person deriving it is resident within the jurisdiction or
not, 2 and there are virtually no restrictions on foreign entities operating
in the domestic market.235 As for transparency, Hong Kong's tax system
233. In addition to its four Reports, the OECD has also produced a series of "Application
Notes" on various aspects of its position on harmful preferential regimes. See OECD, CON-
SOLIDATED APPLICATION NOTE: GUIDANCE IN APPLYING THE 1998 REPORT TO PREFERENTIAL
TAX REGIMES, at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/60/32/30901132.pdf. These seem not, how-
ever, to assist in resolving the basic problem: that the OECD has not defined the distinction
between harmful and harmless preferential regimes. In its 2004 Report, the OECD reported
that of its own member-states' preferential regimes, all had either: (1) been abolished; or(2) been amended to remove their "potentially harmful features"; or (3) "been found not to be
harmful .. " OECD, 2004, supra note 2, at paras. 11-12. This Report, too, however, seems to
offer little or no guidance as to how the distinction is to be drawn between harmful and harm-
less preferential regimes.
234. See Inland Revenue Ordinance §§ 5, 8, 14; WILLOUGHBY & HALKYARD, supra note
205.
235. See SMART & HALKYARD, supra note 129. For tax purposes, Hong Kong is sepa-
rated from the rest of China by a fiscal "firewall." Michael Littlewood, The Taxing and
Spending Powers, in Hong Kong (Anton Cooray ed.), in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF
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seems to score reasonably well-though whether it satisfies the OECD's
requirements in this regard is unclear. On information exchange, it
would presumably fail, for it has few treaties under which to exchange
information (though the number has recently increased significantly).236
On the basis of the key factors, then, Hong Kong's preferential regimes
(if that is what they are) seem to qualify as harmless-but whether the
OECD would reach this conclusion is impossible to say, especially given
that Hong Kong, in fact, functions as a haven.
The eight other factors yield even less satisfactory results. Whether
the way in which Hong Kong defines its tax base is "artificial" is un-
clear. The territory adheres somewhat to "international transfer pricing
principles" but not in anything like the manner the OECD countries gen-
erally do (partly because it has traditionally been a beneficiary of abusive
transfer-pricing).2 3 7 Hong Kong does not tax offshore income, irrespec-
tive of the type of income and irrespective also of the residence of the
person or firm by whom the income is derived.238 It does not offer nego-
tiable tax rates or tax bases. Its secrecy provisions are comparable to
those in OECD countries. 23 9 It does not have access to a wide network of
treaties.2 4 It is, however, in the process of adding to the small number of
treaties to which it is a party, perhaps with a view to exchanging more
information.24 ' The Hong Kong government does not exactly promote
any of its regimes (if that is what they are) "as a tax minimisation vehi-
cle," but it does advertise that its taxes are lower than many other
jurisdictions', and some of this advertising mentions that offshore in-
come is generally not taxed.42 Similarly, the Hong Kong government
does not exactly encourage "purely tax-driven operations." But that
Hong Kong can be used as a tax haven is very well known; encourage-
ment hardly seems necessary.
The three questions as to economic effects yield answers which are
mixed but, on balance, apparently adverse to Hong Kong. Hong Kong
seems both to attract activity from other jurisdictions and to generate
LAWS: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 248, 250 (R. Blanpain ed., 2003). Hong Kong's domestic mar-
ket is presumably therefore Hong Kong, not the whole of China.
236. Since Hong Kong generally does not tax offshore income, its residents are generally
not exposed to double taxation. There is correspondingly less need for treaties than elsewhere.
237. See Inland Revenue Ordinance § 20; WILLOUGHBY & HALKYARD, supra note 205.
238. See Inland Revenue Ordinance §§ 5, 8, 14; WILLOUGHBY & HALKYARD, supra note
205.
239. See Inland Revenue Ordinance § 4.
240. Though whether this should count in Hong Kong's favor or against it is unclear. See
OECD, 1998, supra note 2, at paras. 76-77.
241. See WILLOUGHBY & HALKYARD, supra, note 205.
242. See, e.g., Hong Kong Inland Revenue Department website, at http://
www.ird.gov.hk.
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new activity. Much of this activity (both shifted and new) seems to be
attracted not by the territory's "preferential regimes" (that is, the non-
taxability of some kinds of income from tax) but by the low rate of tax.
Yet Hong Kong also functions as a tax haven. Large sums of money pass
through it without any other significant activity at all.
On the other hand, Hong Kong seems not to be "poaching" tax bases
which "rightly belong" to other countries. Income taxes were introduced
in the territory in 1940, and the system then established remains basi-
cally intact. Offshore income and dividends have never been taxed. A tax
on interest was introduced in 1941, but it was very limited in its scope
and abolished in 1989.43 The legislation has been refined from time to
time but generally with a view to extending its scope.24
All in all, it is difficult to say whether, according to the criteria set
out by the OECD, Hong Kong operates any preferential tax regimes or
whether (if so) they are harmful. Predicting how the OECD might go
about applying its criteria is more difficult still. Hong Kong is, in fact, a
tax haven. The OECD, however, accepts that it is not. If it does not clas-
sify Hong Kong as operating harmful preferential regimes, it is difficult
to see how its project (against havens, let alone against preferential re-
gimes) can succeed. On the other hand, the difficulties lying in the way
of such a classification seem considerable.
There is, moreover, no obvious reason to regard Hong Kong as a
special case. It seems probable that numerous other jurisdictions could
present difficulties comparable in scale but otherwise unique. As I have
recounted,245 the OECD concluded in 2004 that its Member States' pref-
erential regimes had all either been abolished, been amended to remove
their "potentially harmful features," or been found to be "not harmful. 2 46
But it is difficult to see how the OECD can achieve its basic objective
(preserving the tax bases of its Member States) without dealing with
non-member States' preferential regimes rather more harshly than it has
dealt with members'. It seems likely that this will require much political
effort and some dexterous theorizing.
243. The main reason for the abolition of the tax on interest was that Singapore's tax
treatment of interest was, in important respects, more generous than Hong Kong's, and the
Hong Kong government thought it advantageous to compete.
244. See Michael Littlewood, Tax Reform in Hong Kong in the 1970s: Sincere Failure or
Successful Charade?, in STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF TAX LAW 379, 390-410 (John Tiley ed.,
2004); Littlewood, supra note 211, at 227-3 1.
245. See OECD, 2004, supra note 2, at paras. 11-12.
246. Id.
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D. Remedies (Once More)
The OECD's original plan, in 1998, was to require developing coun-
tries to abolish their harmful preferential tax regimes or, at least, to
"remove" their "harmful features. 2 47 Perhaps this is still its plan.248 If so,
the difficulties-both technical and political-are formidable. It also
seems possible, though, that the OECD has lowered its sights. In the case
of havens, the OECD now requires only transparency and information
exchange.49 Given that havens (which commonly seek to undermine
other countries' tax systems) seem manifestly more objectionable than
preferential regimes (which seek merely to attract real investment), it
would seem to be problematic for the OECD to seek to impose more
onerous requirements on countries operating preferential regimes than
on countries functioning as havens. Perhaps, then, the OECD will re-
quire of countries operating harmful preferential regimes only what it
requires of havens-that is transparency and information exchange. But
this seems problematic, too, because it would appear not to achieve the
OECD's basic objective (that is, preventing the erosion of OECD Mem-
ber States' tax bases). Perhaps it is the difficulty posed by this
dilemma-whether to confront the enormously difficult task of actually
eliminating harmful preferential regimes or to settle for much less-
which explains the OECD's apparent lack of progress against preferen-
tial regimes.25'
E. The Difficulty of Eradicating Harmful Preferential Regimes
For a jurisdiction operating preferential regimes to cease to do so
would commonly entail a radical transformation of its tax system. Once
247. OECD, 1998, supra note 2, at Box III.
248. See OECD, 2004, supra note 2.
249. See supra notes 132-134.
250. It is reasonable to suppose that transparency and information exchange will largely
solve the problem in the case of havens but not in the case of preferential regimes.
251. An alternative solution has been suggested by Avi-Yonah, that "demand" countries
(that is, the countries in which goods and services are consumed) should impose a tax on im-
ported goods and services which tax would, however, be refunded in some circumstances to
the country where the goods or services were produced. This would appear to address both the
technical and the political difficulties more satisfactorily than the proposals of the OECD. But
Avi-Yonah's proposal seems also to raise questions. First, it seems possible that the imposition
of a tax at the level suggested might entail cash-flow difficulties for taxpayers. Secondly, Avi-
Yonah's solution calls for governments to collect taxes, the burden of which would seem to be
borne by their own citizens, and then to pass on the revenues raised to other countries. It might
be difficult to persuade voters of the merits of such an arrangement. Or, at least, if voters were
persuaded of the merits of the tax, it might be difficult to persuade them of the merits of hand-
ing the revenues over to someone else. Avi-Yonah notes that it would be reasonable for the
collecting state to withhold for itself a fee for collecting the tax. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 1,
at 1670-74.
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more, Hong Kong illustrates nicely the scale of the problem (and, again,
it seems reasonable to suppose that comparable-but different-
problems would be presented by dozens of other jurisdictions).
As I have explained, Hong Kong generally does not tax offshore in-
come of any kind or interest or dividends.5 2 The elimination of these
"preferential regimes" would, therefore, require Hong Kong to extend its
253tax system to cover income of these types. The people of Hong Kong
have never been taxed on their offshore income, their dividends, or their
* 254interest. So dramatic an extension of the territory's tax system would
obviously produce considerable popular discontent to say the least-
especially if the aim was not to benefit the people of Hong Kong but
merely to comply with an edict issued by the OECD .
The difficulties would be not merely political but technical and ad-
ministrative also. As I have explained, Hong Kong has no tax on income,
as such. Instead, there are separate taxes on rents, income from employ-
ment, and profits. To tax interest and dividends, it would, therefore, be
necessary either to extend the existing taxes to cover income of these
kinds (perhaps by extending the scope of profits tax-but what then to
do about the double taxation of corporate profits?) or to add new taxes
(perhaps a "dividends tax" and an "interest tax") or to scrap the existing
schedular system of taxation and institute in its place a comprehensive
tax on income as such. Any of these courses would obviously entail a
radical transformation of the territory's existing tax system. Extending
Hong Kong's tax system to cover the offshore incomes of persons resi-
dent in Hong Kong would entail similarly radical changes. And that is
not all. The OECD has also proposed that all countries should adopt
252. Offshore income is taxable in very limited circumstances-such as when the tax-
payer is a bank. See Inland Revenue Ordinance § 15(l)(i). Interest, too, is taxable in some
circumstances-such as when the taxpayer is a bank or carrying on a business of money-
lending or supplying goods on credit; interest in those cases being the profits of the business.
See id. § 14; WILLOUGHBY & HALKYARD, supra note 205. Dividends are not taxable in any
ordinary circumstances. See id.
253. Indeed, the OECD's recommendations specifically include that all countries should
tax their residents' offshore incomes. See OECD, 1998, supra note 2, at paras. 104-05.
254. Except in the comparatively limited circumstances referred to in note 252. There
was, in addition, a tax on interest from 1941 until 1989, but its scope was limited. See supra
note 243.
255. Consider how difficult it might be to persuade the U.S. legislature to withdraw the
exemption from tax of income derived by non-residents so as to comply with an edict issued
by the OECD (even though the U.S. is a member of the OECD and the tax would be paid by
non-residents); the extensions to Hong Kong's tax system which the OECD's logic seems to
require are clearly far more substantial (and Hong Kong is not a member of the OECD, and
the tax would fall on residents).
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CFC rules and FIF rules,256 that they should follow the OECD's transfer-
pricing guidelines, and so on.
Such changes would present administrative difficulties. It is cur-
rently unnecessary for Hong Kong's Inland Revenue Department (the
territory's tax authority) to determine whether taxpayers are resident in
the territory or not (for liability depends simply on whether the relevant
income is derived from Hong Kong; residence is irrelevant).2 ' Hong
Kong residents are therefore not required even to declare their offshore
income, and the Inland Revenue Department operates no systems for
determining it. Similarly, Hong Kong residents are not required to de-
clare dividends or (in most circumstances) interest. If Hong Kong were
to tax dividends, interest, and offshore income, not only the law but also
the administration of the law would have to be radically changed. CFC
rules, FIF rules, and adherence to the OECD's transfer-pricing guidelines
would also entail enormous administrative burdens. A complete change
in the Inland Revenue Department's ethos would probably be required,
not to mention a substantial increase in its personnel.
It is unclear how all this is to be reconciled with the OECD's claim
that it is not seeking to determine the structure of non-member States'
tax systems.
F. Requiring Only Transparency and Infonnation Exchange
If, on the other hand, the OECD intends to require of countries oper-
ating harmful preferential regimes only that they make their tax systems
transparent and that they participate in the requisite level of information
exchange, this in itself will not solve the problems with which the Or-
ganization is principally concerned (that is, the erosion of its member
countries' tax bases). Nor, if the race really is to the bottom, will trans-
parency and information exchange save the contestants from getting
there.
In the case of havens, transparency and information exchange will
very largely solve the problem. The reason is that most OECD countries
operate CFC and FIF regimes, and these regimes impose taxes on per-
sons resident in OECD countries in respect of passive income they
accumulate in corporations and other vehicles in tax havens.258 Presuma-
bly, therefore, the OECD countries' existing CFC and FIF regimes are
generally effective against the avoidance of tax using havens (so long as
256. Given that Hong Kong currently does not tax offshore income even if derived di-
rectly by a resident, the introduction of CFC and FIF regimes would represent a very marked
extension of the territory's tax system.
257. See Inland Revenue Ordinance § 8; WILLOUGHBY & HALKYARD, supra note 205.
258. See supra note 62.
Fall 20041
Michigan Journal of International Law
the OECD country in question holds sufficient information about its resi-
dents' transactions in havens-hence, presumably, in the case of havens,
the OECD's eagerness to procure and willingness to settle for transpar-
ency and information exchange). But most OECD countries' CFC and
FIF regimes do not prevent the deferral of tax through active operations
in countries operating preferential regimes (for reasons explained
above).
In order to prevent the erosion of their tax bases as a result of their
residents using preferential regimes, therefore, it would seem to be nec-
essary for the OECD countries either to persuade the countries operating
such regimes to desist or to extend their CFC and FIF regimes to cover
all CFCs and FIFs. Both courses of action would seem to be problematic
but the latter considerably less so-especially given that it would require
the coordination of the OECD's own Member States only and not the
rest of the world as well.
V. THE OECD's RHETORIC
The purpose of the OECD's campaign against "harmful" tax compe-
tition is to protect the treasuries of its members. In order to achieve this,
however, the OECD seems clearly to have thought it expedient to present
the campaign as being of more general interest. The Organization's four
reports accordingly seem to have been intended to serve several pur-
poses. First, they were intended to analyze the "problem" of "harmful"
tax competition and set out a cure, as required by the OECD's members
generally and the G7 countries in particular. This was for the benefit of
these countries, who perceived themselves as losing tax revenues as a
result of havens and harmful preferential regimes. But resolving this
problem would seem clearly to require almost every country in the world
(OECD members and non-members alike) to effect substantial modifica-
tions to its tax system. Not surprisingly, then, the OECD has presented
its project as being not merely beneficial to its own members but as rais-
ing "global welfare.' 259 The Reports' second purpose, therefore, was to
play a part in persuading non-member States, especially tax havens and
states operating preferential tax regimes, that it was in their interest to
join the campaign (or, at least, to surrender to it). Perhaps the objectives
also included persuading people resident in OECD countries that what
was being done for their benefit would not harm deserving poor coun-
tries. In any event, the reports were not merely technical documents but
259. OECD, 1998, supra note 2, at para. 4.
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political ones. As a result, precision seems to have given way to rheto-
ric.260
As might be expected, the reports are notable for their orientation to
the perspective of the G7 countries. They assume that the tax systems to
be found in the major OECD countries are "normal , 6' and they refer to
countries "poaching" tax bases that "rightly belong" to other countries.
262
Similarly, the OECD uses the word "dialogue, 263 to refer to what would
seem to be more accurately described as arm-twisting. Likewise, it de-
scribes its assault upon the tax systems of the rest of the world as
"defensive."264 Perhaps most tellingly, the 1998 Report contained this
statement: "Countries should remain free to design their own tax systems
as long as they abide by internationally accepted standards in doing
so.''265 The problem with this is that there are no "internationally accepted
standards" in taxation--or at least there were none until the OECD took
it upon itself to treat its own norms as such.
That such language is loaded is obvious. In other respects, however,
the nature of the OECD's rhetoric may not be so self-evident. Two of
these require comment. First, the OECD has asserted so repeatedly that
its project against harmful tax competition will raise "global welfare"
that one might think this has somehow been established. But, as is men-
tioned above, the OECD has not even explained what the proposition
means, let alone provided satisfactory evidence in support of it.
Secondly, the OECD's use of the term "tax competition" is particu-
larly misleading. The Organization uses the term to cover both tax
havens and preferential tax regimes. These are, however, very different
sorts of phenomena. Havens do not seek to attract real investment.
Rather, they provide a means by which foreigners can evade tax in their
own countries (typically by means of dishonesty), and typically they
seek to profit by so doing. This seems parasitical and manifestly objec-
tionable. The OECD's claim that it detracts from global welfare,
however defined, seems at least plausible. The disrepute generally at-
taching to tax havens is therefore deserved. Preferential regimes, on the
other hand, are intended to attract real investment. There is nothing dis-
honest about them. They might facilitate avoidance, but they do not
facilitate evasion. 266 They are not parasitical. Perhaps, rather, they are just
260. See Stewart, supra note 8, at 171-88.
261. OECD, 1998, supra note 2, at para. 35.
262. Id. at para. 29.
263. See id. at para. 156. id.
264. Id. at Box II; OECD, 2000, supra note 2, at para. 20.
265. OECD, 1998, supra note 2, at para. 26.
266. That is, countries which operate preferential regimes do not necessarily facilitate
dishonesty. Of course, any such country might also, in addition to operating a preferential
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261another form of healthy economic competition. In any event, the the-
ory that preferential tax regimes contribute to global welfare seems, on
the current state of the evidence, as plausible as its opposite. There is, in
sum, nothing disreputable about preferential regimes.
By lumping tax havens and preferential tax regimes together, the
OECD not only confuses the issues but also creates the impression that
developing countries' preferential regimes are somehow similarly dis-
reputable sorts of phenomena. Poor countries, doing their generally
inadequate best to stimulate growth (and, according to the OECD,
caught up in a race to the bottom, presumably through no fault of their
own), are stigmatized as tax havens. This is misleading and unfair. It also
appears to be deliberate: that is, the OECD seems deliberately to have
put the developing countries' preferential regimes in the same category
as tax havens so as to make it easier to mount an attack on them.
The problem is, essentially, the classification of tax havens as com-
petitive-for there is nothing competitive about them. Or, at least, the
only competition in which havens are generally engaged is with one an-
other. They do not compete with jurisdictions which are not havens-for
their objective is not to attract real investment but merely to facilitate the
evasion of other countries' taxes (and to profit by so doing). Preferential
regimes, on the other hand, are genuinely competitive; countries operate
them so as to offer investors a more attractive place to invest than others
they might choose. Moreover, such competition may well be productive,
for it might tend to produce an optimum balance of taxation and public
spending. The classification of havens as competitive seems calculated to
give competition a bad name. It seems difficult to avoid the conclusion
that there must be something wrong with any project requiring such Or-
wellian justification.
VI. PROMOTING GROWTH
From the OECD's point of view, the problem with preferential tax
regimes is that some of them appear to work. That is, they succeed in
attracting foreign investment. In some cases, they also appear to stimu-
late growth and alleviate poverty. Perhaps they even raise global welfare.
If these regimes did not succeed in attracting foreign investment, the
OECD would presumably take no interest in them. Perhaps, though, the
more serious problem is that some preferential regimes seem not to
work. That is, they do not attract foreign investment, or they attract it in
regime, do so in such a way as to facilitate dishonesty. But if so, it is the dishonesty which is
the problem, not the preferential regime.
267. Roin, supra note 169, at 550-61.
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such a way so as not to promote growth. In some countries, preferential
tax regimes seem to have played a crucial role in attracting foreign in-
vestment, stimulating growth, and alleviating poverty. The obvious
current example is China.268 Other countries, for example Nigeria, have• 269
operated preferential regimes without such positive results.
The extent to which, if at all, China's growth is attributable to its
preferential tax regimes remains to be ascertained. Presumably a number
of other factors contributed also. In particular, the Chinese government's
decision in the late 1970s to permit and encourage commercial enterprise
(of any sort, but in particular foreign investment) seems clearly to have
been a prerequisite to the country's subsequent economic successes.270 It
seems reasonable to suppose that other important contributing factors
might have included China's 5,000 year old civilization, its orderly and
cohesive society, its stable political order, its high levels of literacy and
numeracy, its language (used, as it is, by a fifth of the world's people),
and the industry and entrepreneurial spirit of the Chinese people. China's
revitalized legal system would appear likewise to have been an important
contributing factor. In particular, it seems likely that legal factors con-
tributing to China's economic growth might have included the re-
establishment of property rights (or of something resembling property
rights), of the enforceability (after a fashion) of contracts, of the avail-
ability of privately owned corporations, and of somewhat-credible
procedures for the resolution of commercial disputes.2 7' Last but not
268. See sources cited infra notes 270-273.
269. According to the World Bank, per capita GDP in Nigeria was US$314 in 1980 and
US$275 in 2003 (in constant 1995 US$). WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS
ONLINE, at http://devdata.worldbank.org./query. For an account of the tax incentives operated
by Nigeria, see UNCTAD, TAX INCENTIVES AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT-A GLOBAL
SURVEY at 56-58, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IPC/Misc.3, U.N. Sales No. E.01.1.D.5 (2000).
Nigeria's tax system seems not to provide for preferential treatment for foreign investors as
such. But it does provide for preferential treatment for investors engaged in certain specified
industries, in particular oil and gas, and it appears that all or virtually all investors in these
industries are, in fact, foreign. See, e.g., Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Briefings: Nige-
ria, Economic Structure, at
http://www.economist.com/countries/Nigeria/profile/cfm?folder=Profile%2DEconomic%20St
ructure (2004). Whether the OECD will treat such provisions as preferential regimes is un-
clear.
270. See LEE G. BRANSTETTER & ROBERT C. FEENSTRA, TRADE AND FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT IN CHINA: A POLITICAL ECONOMY APPROACH 1 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Re-
search, Working Paper No. 7100, 1999); Economist Intelligence Unit, Coming of Age:
Multinational Companies in China 10-1 l(June 2004).
271. For accounts of the rapid recent development of commercial law in China, see
WILLIAM BERGH GAMBLE, INVESTING IN CHINA: LEGAL, FINANCIAL, AND REGULATORY
RISKS (2002); DANIEL CHAN ET AL. BAKER & MCKENZIE GUIDE TO CHINA & THE WTO
(2002); ALBERT HUNG-YEE CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEO-
PLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (3d ed. 2004). See also Thomas Yunlong Man, National Legal
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least, China seems somehow to have persuaded almost all the MNEs inS272
the world that they cannot afford not to invest there 2-irrespective of
short-term profitability.2 3 No doubt these factors-and others-played a
more important part in China's recent growth than its preferential tax
regimes. Nonetheless, it seems reasonable to suppose that the country's
preferential tax regimes played a significant part-and still do (hence,
perhaps, the OECD's concern).
Similarly, Nigeria's dismal economic record is presumably attribut-
able to a range of factors . It seems extremely unlikely that preferential
tax regimes, of whatever scale or nature, would on their own make much
difference. But, in combination with other factors, perhaps they would.
It would, therefore, seem to be useful to construct a taxonomy of
preferential tax regimes so as to determine the characteristics of those
which seem to succeed-that is, to determine the characteristics which
seem to correlate with the attraction of foreign investment, with growth,
and with the alleviation of poverty. Similarly, it would seem useful to
Restructuring in Accordance with International Norms: GATT/WTO and China's Foreign
Trade Reform, 4 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 471 (1997).
272. E.g., Zhang Jin, Wu i: China to Go Further than WTO Promises, CHINA DAILY,
Sept. 9, 2004. "Until July, a total of more than 490,000 foreign-invested enterprises have been
set up in China with actual investment of US$540 billion ... Among world's top 500 multina-
tional corporations, more than 400 have invested in China ... ;" Economist Intelligence Unit,
supra note 270, at 6 "The very visible growth of demand within China has made building a
business there not only feasible but also essential for any performance-oriented multinational.
These days, a truly global company would no more ignore China than it would the UK or
France." Id.
273. E.g., Economist Intelligence Unit, supra note 270, at 10-11:
In the past the enthusiasm of the initial trip rarely lasted long, with companies soon
realising that the potential market was, in reality, better measured in thousands
rather than millions, and that accessing even this pool of consumers was made diffi-
cult, if not impossible, by poor infrastructure and anti-business policies. China
became famous as a market in which foreign firms lost their shirts. For many multi-
nationals, it became a market to bypass, not cultivate ... For much of the 1980s and
1990s the experience of multinationals seeking to tap China's domestic market was
defined by unrealistic expectations and disappointment. Now it is characterised by
real opportunities, revenue growth and sometimes even profit. China is no longer a
market that multinationals should or can ignore.... Our own survey shows that for-
eign firms still judge success in China by revenue growth and market share rather
than return on capital.
274. E.g., OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2004 NATIONAL TRADE ESTI-
MATE REPORT 354 (2004):
Despite efforts to improve the country's investment climate, disincentives to invest-
ing in Nigeria continue to plague foreign entrepreneurs. Potential investors must
contend with high business taxes, confusing land ownership laws, arbitrary applica-
tion of regulations, corruption, and extensive crime. There is no tradition supporting
the sanctity of contracts, and the court system for settling commercial disputes is
weak and sometimes biased.
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determine the characteristics of preferential tax regimes which fail-that
is, to determine the characteristics which seem to correlate with a failure
to attract foreign investment at all or with the attraction of foreign in-
vestment but without stimulating growth or alleviating poverty.
Very considerable work of this nature has been done. Generally,
however, this literature concentrates on the formal characteristics of the
preferential regimes in question-that is, on the country's tax law gener-
ally and on the rules providing for the preferential regime in particular.
The rules are no doubt important, but it seems possible that other factors
may be important also. The case of China, for example, suggests that it
might be beneficial for a country to offer not just one preferential regime
but a whole bewildering array of them, varying in mostly minor respects;
for the rules providing for such regimes to be in a non-European lan-
guage; for the rules to be vague; for their interpretation and application
thus to require the exercise of broad administrative discretions; and for
the administration exercising such discretions to be effectively free of
judicial supervision. In sum, it may be that one reason China's preferen-
tial regimes have succeeded is that they are not based on the rule of law
(insofar, at least, as the idea of the rule of law is typically understood in
the West).
It may be, too, that these are the same characteristics which foreign
investors in China find most irksome. Indeed, perhaps one measure of a
preferential tax regime's likelihood of success is the degree to which it
infuriates foreign investors. But foreign investors put up with this infu-
riation only because they are making profits or think that they will soon
make profits. China's achievement, then, seems to have been to attract
(by means of a variety of enticements, including preferential tax treat-
ment) a very large volume of foreign investment but to attract it on
China's own terms so that much of the foreign investment in China has
been notoriously unprofitable;275 the great majority of foreign investors
nonetheless continue to invest, and more arrive every year;276 China has
275. Economist Intelligence Unit, supra, note 270, at 22:
It is accepted wisdom that the China accounts of almost all foreign firms drip with
red ink. Executives in multinational companies (MNCs), dazzled by the prospect of
selling to one billion consumers, have failed to notice that few of these people actu-
ally earn much money, that selling even to this group is made difficult by the
country's poor infrastructure and that any resultant profits would be siphoned off by
corrupt local officials. Historically, this perception has not been far from the truth. It
is not difficult to uncover a number of horror stories detailing the misadventures of
foreign firms that have overestimated the size of the domestic market and under-
stated the difficulties of accessing it-and ended up losing lots of money.
276. Foreign direct investment in China rose from about US$5 billion in 1991 to more
than US$50 billion in 2002. Id. at 7.
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enjoyed enormous spillover benefits (in the form of employment and
technology transfer, in particular);2 7 and the Chinese State, since its pref-
erential regimes tend to take the form of finite tax holidays, will be in a
position to tax foreign investors in the future (perhaps, if current trends
continue, at about the same time as the foreign investors' Chinese ven-
tures become profitable) . 8
VII. THE OECD OR THE UN?
The two basic components of the OECD project-the campaign
against havens and the campaign against preferential regimes-both en-
tail the Organization seeking to persuade non-member countries to make
changes to their tax systems. In respect of both campaigns, therefore,
there arises the issue of the appropriateness of the OECD's dictating tax
policy to non-member States.
From the inception of the project, the OECD has taken pains to em-
phasize that it is not attempting to dictate non-member countries' tax
policy. For example, in its original 1998 Report, the Committee on Fiscal
Affairs observed: "The Committee recognizes that there are no particular
reasons why any two countries should have the same level and structure
of taxation. Although differences in tax levels and structures may have
implications for other countries, these are essentially political decisions
for national governments. 279 In its 2001 Report, the Committee made the
point more forcibly: "The OECD project [it said] does not seek to dictate
to any country what its tax rate should be, or how its tax system should
be structured. 28°
In the earlier phases of the project, at least, such protestations seem
plainly to have been disingenuous. For the OECD's aim was (and appar-
277. "Of course, FDI projects often involve a transfer of valuable technology and man-
agement expertise, in addition to an inflow of funds." Id. at 18. "Foreign companies bring
capabilities, skills, technologies and expertise which domestic companies lack and, through
competition, can compel Chinese companies to improve and strengthen themselves." Id. at 21.
278. It is difficult to address these issues without considering broader strategic questions.
In particular, is the OECD's objective to maximize its Member States' welfare in absolute
terms and to help the rest of the world to do likewise? Or to help the rest of the world only
insofar as it adopts acceptably democratic procedures? Or not even then? According to Gold-
man Sachs, the Chinese economy will be as large as the American by 2041. DOMINIC WILSON
& ROOPA PURUSHOTHAMAN, DREAMING WITH BRICs: THE PATH TO 2050 3 (Goldman Sachs,
Global Economics Paper No. 99, 2003), at http://www.gs.com/insight/research/reports/
99.pdf. A billion people will have raised themselves out of poverty. But the world's military
and political balance of power will have been transformed, too, and in favor of a state whose
government still operates along Leninist lines.
279. OECD, 1998, supra note 2, at para. 26. See also OECD, 2001, supra note 2, at para.
16.
280. OECD, 2001, supra note 2, at para. 3.
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ently remains) to eliminate tax havens and harmful preferential tax re-
gimes, and the Organization seems initially to have thought that this
would require the havens and the countries operating harmful preferen-
tial regimes to restructure their tax systems. Despite its protestations to
the contrary, then, the OECD seems to have regarded dictating the struc-
ture of other countries' tax systems as the basic point of the exercise. In
2001, however, as I have recounted, the OECD revised its objectives. It
no longer required the havens to restructure their tax systems. All it now
required them to do was to make their tax systems transparent and to
adopt procedures providing for the exchange of information.81 So long
as a haven met these two requirements, it would apparently be free to
structure its tax system however it wished. Perhaps, then, the OECD's
requirements of harmful preferential regimes were revised so as to corre-
spond with its requirements for havens, though this remains unclear.
But even if it is so, the OECD would seem still to require other
countries to change their tax systems; it is just that its requirements
would no longer relate to the structure of these countries' tax systems.
Rather, they would relate only to transparency and information ex-
change. The Organization's claim that it is not dictating to non-member
States how they should structure their tax systems might now, therefore,
be strictly true but only in a sense so narrow as to be positively mislead-
ing. In other words, the OECD is still dictating policy but has changed
somewhat the policy it is dictating.
The question, then, is not whether the OECD is attempting to dictate
tax policy to non-member countries, for plainly it is. The question,
rather, is whether this is appropriate. In one sense, the question is naive.
The Organization's basic function is to promote the interests of its mem-
bers.282 That is, presumably, what it has been doing (or, at least, what it
thinks it has been doing). It has no obligation to countries outside its
membership, or, at least, any such obligation is subordinate to the obliga-
tions owed by the Organization to its members.
It is important also in this context to consider the nature of the
threats with which the OECD has backed up its attempts to dictate tax
policy to other countries. It has threatened that its Member States will
disallow the deductibility of payments made to entities in havens and
that they will impose withholding taxes on payments made to residents
of havens. 23 These are serious threats; they appear, if carried out, to have
281. What it means to "restructure" a tax system is a semantic question susceptible to a
range of answers. But I take the OECD to have meant that the "structure" of a tax system
consists of provisions determining what is taxable and at what rate. On this basis, I have
treated requirements relating to transparency and information exchange as not structural.
282. See Paris Convention, supra note 14, art. 1.
283. See OECD, 1998, supra note 2, at paras. 158-61.
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the potential to cause very considerable distress. The OECD has also
threatened that its Member States will withhold non-essential aid to ha-
vens.2 Again, the consequences of withholding aid seem likely to be
serious.
The OECD has not announced what actions it might take against
countries operating preferential regimes. Perhaps, indeed, it has not yet
decided. Given, though, that preferential regimes seem clearly less ob-jectionable than havens, the OECD will perhaps not propose to penalize
countries operating preferential regimes any more severely than it pro-
poses to punish havens. It seems likely, therefore, that the OECD (if it
pursues its campaign against preferential regimes at all) will propose
adopting the same measures against countries operating them as it rec-
ommends against havens-that is disallowing deductions to entities in
offending jurisdictions, imposing withholding taxes on payments made
to residents of offending jurisdictions, and withholding non-essential aid.
Whether these actions should be characterized as violations of sov-
ereignty (as some have suggested) 285 is largely a matter of semantics. For
a country, or a group of countries, to dictate another country's tax policy
is, in a sense, a violation of sovereignty. On the other hand, if the tax
havens are free to structure their tax systems however they wish, why not
the OECD Member States? That is, if the tax havens are free to structure
their tax systems so as to facilitate the avoidance of other countries'
taxes, it seems to follow that other countries should be free to structure
their tax systems so as to discourage the use of havens. Conversely, if
there are limits on the OECD States' freedom to structure their tax sys-
tems however they wish, such restrictions presumably apply to havens
also. Similarly, it seems difficult to categorize the withholding of aid as a
violation of sovereignty.
Even so, the OECD project entails the formulation of international
norms in a fundamentally important area of public policy. It entails also
the bringing to bear of very considerable pressure to encourage compli-
ance. It would seem obviously preferable, in principle, for any project of
this nature to be undertaken by as representative a body as possible. The
OECD seems not to satisfy this criterion. Its membership is still rela-
tively small and very unrepresentative. The Organization is clearly not
representative of the world as a whole; despite the widening of its mem-
bership over the years, it is still very clearly a rich countries' club-as is
evidenced by the fact that the project on harmful tax competition seems
to have been launched at the instigation of the G7 countries and that its
284. See OECD, 2000, supra note 2, at para. 36.
285. See BiswAs, supra note 8, at 1-2; Carlson, supra note 8, at 177-80; Townsend,
supra note 8, at 219-20.
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purpose seems to be to protect the G7 countries' treasuries. There is no
reason to suppose that the interests of the OECD members-let alone of
the G7 countries-happen to coincide with the interests of the world as a
whole.
286
Moreover, there was an alternative; the United Nations. Indeed,
that the UN would have been, in principle at least, a more appropriate
vehicle for a project of this nature seems obvious. The question, there-
fore, arises: Why did the G7 countries choose the OECD as the vehicle
for their project rather than the United Nations? The G7 countries them-
selves seem not to have offered any explanation. Nor has the OECD
(other than its vague and unsupported assertions that the whole world
will somehow benefit).
Two answers, however, seem possible. First, if the project had been
undertaken by the United Nations rather than the OECD, it seems inevi-
table that it would have been handled differently and that it would have
produced different outcomes. Specifically, it seems likely that it would
have produced results calculated to be beneficial to the world generally
rather than to the members of the OECD in particular. In other words,
the G7 countries might have used the OECD rather than the United Na-
tions precisely because they saw it as in their interest to protect their own
treasuries rather than to produce some more generally advantageous ac-
cord. This, of course, is not an ordering of priorities which the rest of the
world can be expected to endorse. It is also possible, however, that, even
if a project of this nature would be beneficial to the world as a whole, the
United Nations might find it politically difficult to initiate such a project.
That is, the United Nations, whilst in principle the most appropriate287
body to undertake the project, might in fact have been unable to do so.
In any event, it is still possible that the OECD's project will pro-
duce outcomes beneficial to the world as a whole (as, indeed, the
Organization claims it will), even if it would have been better under-
taken by the United Nations. In this respect, it seems necessary to
286. See, e.g., High-Level International Intergovernmental Consideration of Financing
for Development, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Agenda Item 101, U.N. Doc. A/55/1000 (2001).
Another possibility is the World Trade Organization. See Joel Slemrod & Reuven Avi-Yonah,
(How) Should Trade Agreements deal with Income Tax issues?, 55 TAX L. REv. 533 (2002). A
third is the establishment of a World Tax Organization. See Homer, supra note 8.
287. For example, it might be that eliminating tax havens would raise welfare (however
defined) in OECD countries without harming any other countries apart from havens and that
eliminating havens would therefore (given their very small aggregate population compared to
the OECD) raise global welfare. But non-OECD countries might nonetheless oppose the
eradication of havens. It is possible that havens, even if harmful to developing countries, are
more harmful to developed countries. If this is so, developing countries might not support the
eradication of havens because the consequences might include a widening of the gap between
developing and developed countries. In other words, developing countries might see it as in
their interest to add to the wealth of the developed world only if adequately compensated.
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distinguish between the two main arms of the project, the campaign
against havens and the campaign against preferential regimes. Specifi-
cally, that the OECD should have taken it upon itself to orchestrate a
campaign against tax havens seems defensible. That it should have em-
barked on a campaign against non-member countries' preferential
regimes is much harder to justify.
The reason, in short, is that the campaign against havens seems rela-
tively defensible on the merits. That it has been undertaken by the
OECD, rather than the United Nations, is a serious flaw but perhaps not
so serious that it would be better if the Organization had never embarked
on it. It would have been better if it had been the United Nations rather
than the OECD which had embarked on the project-for the United Na-
tions' mandate to conduct a project of this sort seems clearly superior to
the OECD's, and the project would therefore possess greater legitimacy
under the auspices of the United Nations. In particular, the project would
then look less like an attempt to protect the special interests of the G7
countries and more like the attempt to further global welfare that the
OECD claims it to be. Equally, it would be better now if the OECD were
to hand the project over to the United Nations rather than pursue it itself.
But for the campaign against havens to be run by the OECD is perhaps
better than for it not to be run at all. The reason is that it seems reason-
able to suppose that the eradication of tax havens would not only raise
global welfare (as the OECD claims) but would also accord with the par-
ticular interests of developing countries (other than, of course, those
developing countries currently operating as tax havens).2 8' At least, it
seems unlikely that the campaign against havens will actually harm de-
veloping countries-other than, again, those developing countries
actually operating as havens.2 19 It would have been much better, to be
sure, for the project to have been undertaken by a suitably representative
body. That it was not is a serious shortcoming. Nonetheless, the outcome
seems defensible.
The campaign against preferential regimes raises more difficult
questions. As has been explained, its merits are far less clear. Moreover,
the total number of people resident in non-OECD countries operating
288. Leaving aside the possibility that the eradication of tax havens would widen the gap
between developed and developing countries and that this would be to the relative disadvan-
tage of the latter.
289. It seems likely that the less-developed countries, if asked to express an opinion on
the OECD's campaign against tax havens, would generally not have been supportive. Indeed,
it seems likely that it was for exactly this reason that the G7 decided not to ask them. It does
not follow, however, that the campaign was not in their interest. One reason for this is that
many developing countries' governments are not democratic, and their politicians and bureau-
crats are notorious for their personal use of tax havens. See also supra text accompanying note
287.
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preferential regimes is enormous. These countries seem to include, to
identify only the most populous of them, China, India, Indonesia, Rus-
sia, Pakistan, Brazil, Nigeria, and Bangladesh. 290 The number of people
potentially on the receiving end of the OECD's campaign against prefer-
ential regimes seems, thus, to be several times the combined populations
of the OECD countries and a very substantial majority-perhaps an
overwhelming majority--of the world's population.29' The campaign
against preferential regimes would clearly possess greater legitimacy if
handled by the United Nations rather than the OECD. Indeed, so long as
it remains under the auspices of the OECD, the campaign against prefer-
ential regimes will be difficult to justify (other than on the basis that it is
legitimate for the OECD's own Member States to promote their own in-
terests at the acknowledged expense of the rest of the world). Moreover,
even if the OECD were to offer to hand the campaign against preferen-
tial regimes over to the United Nations, it seems unlikely that this would
suffice to cure its deficiencies. The reasons are as follows.
If the United Nations were to adopt the OECD's goal of ridding the
world of tax havens, it would seem reasonable also for it to adopt the
work done towards that goal by the OECD to date. That is, it would
seem reasonable, if the United Nations were to adopt the end, for it to
adopt the means also. It seems possible, too, that the United Nations
would, in fact, take this view (if, that is, it were to take on the project at
all), for, if the objective of eliminating havens is accepted, the means
adopted by the OECD does not seem objectionable.
In the case of the campaign against preferential regimes, however,
this seems far less clear. The United Nations remains to be convinced of
292
the merits of this campaign. But, even if the United Nations were to
accept that preferential regimes are harmful and to adopt the goal of
eradicating them, it seems unlikely that it would adopt also the way in
which the OECD has proposed to go about achieving that goal. For the
OECD's motives seem mixed at best; the project was intended (or so the
Organization has maintained) to benefit the whole world, but it was also
intended to benefit the more particular interests of the members of the
OECD (and, more particularly still, those of the G7 countries). Conse-
quently, the OECD's work seems tainted. It would be better, therefore,
for the United Nations to start afresh.
290. But which countries the OECD will regard as operating preferential regimes, and
which of these it will regard as harmful, remains to be seen.
291. In contrast, the number of people resident in tax havens is tiny, and the number
resident in jurisdictions identified by the OECD as havens is smaller still (because of the
omissions from the Organization's list).
292. At any rate, the United Nations seems to have shown no sign of any inclination to
adopt the OECD's project.
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A good place to begin would be with an investigation into the effects
of preferential regimes. That is, the United Nations should start by at-
tempting to determine whether preferential regimes are, in fact, harmful.
It should not start, as the OECD did, by taking this crucial question on
faith from the G7. Rather, it should attempt to measure the effects of
preferential regimes both on the countries that operate them and on those
that do not. It would also be helpful if the United Nations were to at-
tempt to discover why some preferential regimes seem to have
succeeded in attracting foreign investment and others have not. This
might be useful to countries operating, or considering operating, prefer-
ential regimes (if it turns out that preferential regimes add to global
welfare rather than detract from it as maintained by the OECD).
It is possible that the United Nations, having investigated the ques-
tion, would conclude that the OECD's analysis is sound. It might also
decide to adopt the same courses of action as have been proposed by the
OECD. This would not, however, mean that the investigation was a
waste of time and effort, for it would give the project the theoretical
foundation and legitimacy it currently lacks. It is also possible that the
United Nations might propose other courses of action (for example, that
capital-exporting countries, if concerned about other countries' preferen-
tial regimes, should deal with them by means of their own CFC and FIF
regimes) or none. In any event, it would presumably be helpful for the
OECD to make available to the United Nations whatever record of its
project it has maintained. Before the OECD Member States arranged for
the Organization to embark on the project, they (or, at least, some of
them) presumably collated and analyzed evidence of some kind, upon
the basis of which they concluded that preferential regimes were harmful
(or, at least, potentially harmful). It would likewise be helpful for these
countries to make their analyses available to the United Nations and to
publish them-for, so long as they remain unpublished, the suspicion
will remain that the reason is that they support the theory that the devel-
oping countries benefit from operating preferential tax regimes.
The OECD's work on double taxation and tax treaties is instructive
in this regard. There are currently about 1,500 tax treaties in the world.
Almost all of them are based on a model devised by the OECD.2 93 The
Organization's aim, in devising this model, and in revising it from time
to time, was to meet the needs of its members.294 Consequently, the
model treaty, although representing some sort of optimal satisfaction of
the OECD's members, is widely perceived as biased in favor of the de-
293. OECD, OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL (2003).
294. See id. at 1-1-14; PHILIP BAKER, DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTIONS: A MANUAL ON
THE OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL A-i to J-4 (3d ed. 2004).
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veloped countries and against the less-developed. Subsequently, the
United Nations facilitated the development of another model tax treaty,
intended not to suffer from this bias.29 This United Nations model treaty
is, however, closely based on its OECD predecessor. If the task of devis-
ing the model upon which the world's tax treaties were to be based had
fallen to the United Nations instead of to the OECD, it seems likely that
the result would have been different, and perhaps superior. It would also
have enjoyed greater legitimacy. The same would seem to be true of any
coordinated action against (or in support of) preferential tax regimes.
It is also worth noting that diversity among nations may be an inher-
ently desirable phenomenon-and worth preserving and fostering, even
at a cost. The homogenizing of the world's legal systems and tax systems
is, therefore, not necessarily a good thing, especially if it is effectively
imposed by some countries on others. The OECD project has an uncom-
fortable but pervasive feel of Big Brother to it. In a sense, the project is a
product of democratic processes. It is, however, remote. Even in OECD
countries, most well-informed voters seem to be wholly unaware of it.
Moreover, most of the people affected by the project do not live in
OECD countries; consequently, they do not enjoy even the formality of a
vote.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The OECD's campaign against tax havens and harmful preferential
tax regimes might be defended on the basis that the Organization's prin-
cipal function is to promote the interests of its members 96 and that that is
the objective to which the campaign is directed.297 Whatever obligations
the Organization owes to countries outside its membership are presuma-
bly subordinate to the obligations it owes to its members. Perhaps, too,
there can be no objection to the OECD's using to this end whatever law-
ful means it finds advantageous, including dubious claims about
maximizing global welfare. To this it might be added that the OECD's
members are subject to, at most, a merely moral obligation to do any-
thing about relieving poverty in other parts of the world and that, as a
matter of practical politics, they are unlikely to go so far as to tolerate
the compromising of their own economies and public finances.
295. U.N. DEP'T OF ECONOMICS & SOCIAL AFFAIRS, U.N. MODEL DOUBLE TAXATION
CONVENTION BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, U.N. Sales No.
E.01 .XVI.2 (2001).
296. See Paris Convention, supra note 14, at art. 1.
297. Whether the campaign, if successful, will achieve the objective is, as I have indi-
cated, debatable.
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Such points might be valid, but they are far short of the whole truth.
The OECD has embarked on a campaign to eradicate harmful preferen-
tial tax regimes, 29' and it has claimed that this campaign will contribute
to global welfare. It has not, however, substantiated the claim. Indeed, it
has not even attempted to do so. Moreover, the OECD's project presents
technical difficulties which the Organization has not addressed (or, at
least, if it has addressed them, it has not published the results). And yet
the OECD's intention is to require other countries to cooperate and to
punish them if they do not. This is unsatisfactory in several respects.
Perhaps most importantly, it is disingenuous: the OECD's chief concern
is the G7 countries' treasuries, and the Organization has offered no satis-
factory evidence for its claim that the world as a whole will benefit.
Moreover, the resort to disingenuous argument, public threats, and per-
haps other means also to procure the cooperation of non-OECD
countries seems likely to aggravate the ill-will with which much of the
rest of the world regards the G7. Worse, it seems likely that at least some
developing countries will suffer a loss of investment if they comply with
the OECD's wishes and close down their preferential tax regimes. This is
likely to aggravate ill-will further, and the OECD's claim that the proc-
ess is raising global welfare is likely to be felt as salt in the wound. Last
but not least, it seems precipitate for the OECD to have embarked on the
implementation of its project without, apparently, having first devised
solutions to the technical problems it poses. It is conceivable that the
project will fail, in which case a great deal of time, money, effort, and
political good-will will have been wasted. Even if the project succeeds,
its cost may prove exorbitant.
It would seem, then, to be in the interest of the OECD, and the rest
of the world, for the Organization to revise its strategy. One possibility
would be for the Organization to postpone its campaign against preferen-
tial regimes until such time as it has established the validity of the theory
upon which it is based. A second would be to pass the project to the
United Nations. If the United Nations is prepared to take it on, the pro-
ject will at least enjoy the legitimacy that comes with broad-based
international support, and the lack of a coherent theoretical foundation
supported by satisfactory evidence will be less of a problem. Conversely,
if the G7 cannot arrange for United Nations support, that would seem to
betoken widespread international opposition, or at least lack of interest.
This, in turn, might mean that the project is unlikely to succeed in any
event. Finally, if the OECD cannot arrange United Nations support but
wishes to proceed regardless, it would be seemly for it to base the pro-
298. And tax havens. But, as is indicated in the introduction, the primary concern of this
paper is with preferential regimes, not havens.
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ject cleanly on its real rationale (the furthering of the Member States'
collective interests, as perceived by the Organization) and to dispense
with the rhetoric about improving global welfare until, again, its validity
has been established.
The OECD maintains that eradicating preferential tax regimes (or, at
least, such of them as are "harmful") will raise global welfare. Maximiz-
ing global welfare seems a noble objective, but it also does not seem to
be a principle upon which international relations are usually based. Per-
haps it would be a good thing if it were. If so, however, foisting tax
reform on unenthusiastic developing countries seems an oblique way to
go about it. It would seem more effective for the OECD and its members
to address the goal more directly-for example, by reducing the restric-
tions they put on imports from less-developed countries, by reducing the
restrictions they put on immigration from less-developed countries, or by
simply increasing the aid they make available to them.

